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"As calamitous as the sub-prime blowup seems, it is only the
beginning.... The credit bubble spawned abuses throughout the system.
Sub-prime lending just happened to be the most egregious of the lot, and
thus the first to have the cockroaches scurrying out in plain view."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States ("U.S.") economy has been shaken by the
worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. 2 In the span of a
few months, Wall Street regressed from its most profitable era to
the brink of financial collapse. The five largest investment banks
failed, were acquired, or were converted into holding companies,
the world's largest insurance company and two mortgage-lending
conglomerates were placed under government control, and the
Dow Jones Industrial Average, which reached all-time highs in Oc-
tober 2007, lost over half of its aggregate value.4 The markets,
gripped with panic and confusion, were beyond the control of even
1. Eric Sprott & Sasha Solunac, The Popping of the Credit Bubble Has Only just
Begun, SPROrr ASSET MGMT. (March 2007), http://www.sprott.com/Docs/Markets
ataGlance/03-2007.pdf.
2. See Credit Crisis - The Essentials, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/
reference/timestopics/subjects/c/creditcrisis/index.html?offset=0&s=newest
(last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (outlining causes and effects of financial crisis); see MAu-
REEN BURTON ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS
210-11 (2d ed. 2010) (discussing mortgage market collapse and resulting financial
crisis). Burton details the on-going financial crisis by stating that:
This latest downturn was related to a severe crisis in the financial system
that began with a crisis in the mortgage market stemming from the sub-
prime loan debacle and the collapse of housing prices. By September
2008, what started in the mortgage markets had spread to global financial
markets as credit markets froze up and the economy seemed on the verge
of possibly the worst crisis since the great depression. Policy makers
worked frantically to prop up the flailing economy. In the largest bailout
in history, policy makers got a reluctant Congress to pass a $700 billion
package while the [Federal Reserve] was taking historic actions to miti-
gate the crisis.
Id.
3. See Ellen Harnick, The Crisis in Housing and Housing Finance. What Caused It?
What Didn't, What's Next?, 31 W. NEW. ENG. L. REv. 625, 625-27 (2009) (explaining
rapid economic collapse).
4. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Saving The Global Financial System: International
Financial Reforms and United States Financial Reform, Will They Do TheJob, 43 UCC L.
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the most powerful world institutions.5 The U.S. Government strug-
gled to restore order out of chaos as Wall Street fought feverously
just to keep its head above water.6
The financial crisis continues to plague the U.S. economy, and
the prospect of an expedient recovery does not seem promising.7
J. ART. 3, 3-4 (2010) (discussing failings of major financial companies).
Schoenbaum stated:
In the summer of 2007 Bear Sterns, at the time the fifth largest invest-
ment bank in the US with over 14,000 employees experienced heavy
losses due to the collapse in value of its two principal hedge funds. Bear
Stearns never recovered, and in March, 2008, US regulatory officials, Ben
Bernanke, the chairman of the US Federal Reserve and Hank Paulson,
the Secretary of the Treasury, quietly arranged a shotgun sale of Bear
Sterns to J.P. Morgan Chase at the bargain-basement price of $10 per
share . . . . In September, 2008 the worst fears came to pass: in quick
succession (1) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed into US govern-
ment "conservatorship"; (2) Lehman Brothers, a venerable investment
bank with over 25,000 employees, declared bankruptcy and this time the
US government did not intervene; and (3) American International
Group (AIG), the world's largest insurer, became insolvent only to be
rescued by the US Federal Reserve, which pumped billions in "bailout"
money in return for preferred (non-voting) stock.
Id. See also Carrick Mollenkamp et. al., Crisis on Wall Street as Lehman Totters, Merrill
is Sold, AIG Seeks to Raise Cash: Fed Will Expand Its Lending Arsenal in a Bid to Calm
Markets; Moves Cap a Momentous Weekend for American Finance, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15,
2008, at Al (discussing failings of large financial conglomerates).
5. See Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Finan-
cial Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INsT. 5, 7-8 (2009) (outlining proximate causes of fi-
nancial crisis); see also Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the
Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REv. 1257, 1259 (2009) (citing investment banks'
practices of creating structured products, which entails purchasing, pooling, pack-
aging, and selling loans as securities). As a result of these practices, the housing
market expanded wildly and eventually collapsed. See id. at 1262 (finding that fi-
nancial institutions' unwillingness to lend caused problems throughout U.S. econ-
omy). This collapse caused investment banks to incur large financial losses and
rendered the banks unable and unwilling to extend credit to the remainder of the
economy. See id. (same).
6. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Con-
glomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN L. REV. 963, 1015-
35 (2009) (recounting series of events leading up to mortgage market collapse and
financial crisis).
7. See, e.g., Randall Smith, Bank Stocks are Facing Headwinds, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3,
2011, at Cl (explaining that recovery of investment banks will be difficult in 2011);
Mitra Kalita & Sudeep Reddy, Housing Recovery Stalls: Fresh Fall in Home Prices is
Headwind for Economy; Other Signs Still Strong, WALL ST.J., Dec. 29, 2010, at Al (spec-
ulating that "[a] new bout of declining home prices is threatening to hamper U.S.
recovery . . . "); Robbie Whelan, Faces of the Home-Foreclosure Crisis: In the Wave of
Delinquencies That Began Four Years Ago, Mortgage Holders Followed Many Different
Routes to Default, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2010, at A4 ("The foreclosure crisis that
erupted four years ago has claimed more than five million American homes -
about 10% of all homes with a mortgage."); Nick Timiraos et. al., Mortgage Damage
Spreads: Big Bank Stocks Hit Again as Modern Finance Collides With the Legal System,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2010, at Al (considering long-term effects of mortgage-mar-
ket collapse). But see Ruth Simon, Banks Open Loan Spigot: Uptick in Lending to Busi-
ness Is Expected to Accelerate Next Year, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 2010 ("Some U.S. banks
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Major flaws in the securities laws and the lack of regulation of the
securitization process permitted the financial crisis to unfold. The
primary flaws included the broad exemptions for privately-placed
securities and the faulty assumptions underlying the securities
laws." The private-placement exemptions effectively eliminated
oversight of the securitization process and allowed investment
banks to abuse structured product creation causing systemic risk to
build-up within the economy. 9 Furthermore, the securities laws fail
to consider investors' inabilities to determine the merits of struc-
tured product investments.10
Although hopes of the resurgence of a stable and steady econ-
omy remain grim in the short-term, an important opportunity exists
to adopt regulatory measures that will prevent or at least mitigate
the possibility of calamities such as the financial crisis in the fu-
are starting to increase their lending to businesses as demand for loans rises and
healthier banks seek to grab customers from weaker rivals."); James E. Hagerty &
Dana Mattioli, Big Firms Poised to Spend Again, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2011, at Bi ("Big
U.S. companies have cleaned up their balance sheets and flush with cash, appear
open to using it in 2011 . . .").
8. See Daniel J. Morrissey, The Road Not Taken: Rethinking Securities Regulation
and the Case For Federal Merit Review, 44 U. RICH. L. REv. 647, 647-50 (2010) (assert-
ing that flaws of federal securities laws 'jeopardize the soundness of our entire
capital markets"). Securitization and the abuse of structured investments such as
Mortgage Backed Securities ("MBSs"), Collateralized Mortgage Obligations
("CMOs"), Collateralized Debt Obligations ("CDOs"), Squared CDOs, and syn-
thetic CDOs played an integral role in causing the mortgage market collapse and
resulting financial crisis. See Brian J.M. Quinn, The Failure ofPrivate Ordering and the
Financial Crisis of 2008, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 549, 567-69 (2009) (considering
securitization's role in financial crisis); see also Morrissey, supra at 649 (providing
main flaws of federal securities laws). Morrissey stated that:
By adopting disclosure as the underlying philosophy of the federal securi-
ties laws, the framers of that legislation put too much faith in the pru-
dence of investors and the self-policing mechanisms of the capital
markets.. . . The weaknesses in such a half-measured approach were com-
pounded when even that flawed system of financial regulation was under-
mined by an expansion of the exemptions to its central requirement, i.e.,
that securities first be registered before they are sold.
Id.
9. See Quinn, supra note 8, at 653-56 (citing exemptions that allowed invest-
ment banks to package and sell structured investments without oversight).
10. See generally Charles R. P. Pouncy, The Rational Rogue: Neoclassical Economic
Ideology in the Regulation of the Financial Profession, 26 VT. L. REV. 263, 291-05 (2002)
(describing disclosure philosophy and its failures); Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate
Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities. Securities Regulation, Derivatives Regulation,
Gambling and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 375, 401 (2005) [hereinaf-
ter Hazen I] (urging consistent regulatory regimes for securities, derivatives, gam-
bling, and insurance); Morrissey, supra note 8, at 683-85 (asserting that federal
merit review, involving government having authority to prohibit sale of meritless
securities, could have mitigated effects that securitization and structured products
had on economy).
5
Chuff: Rolling the Dice on Financial Regulatory Reform: Gambling Law as
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2011
574 VILLANOVA SPoRTS & ENr. LAW JOURNAL
ture.1" A positive development was the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re-
form and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 ("Dodd-Frank Act")
that President Obama signed into law on July 21, 2010.12 Obama
vied that the Dodd-Frank Act "will put a stop to a lot of the bad
loans that fueled a debt-based bubble."13 The Act authorizes major
changes to U.S. securities laws and has extended regulatory jurisdic-
tion over areas of finance that were not previously regulated, in-
cluding securitization.14 The Act, however, is merely a general
mandate and will only assume its true identity through the imple-
mentation by administrative agencies such as the Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC"), the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission ("CFTC"), and the Department of Treasury.' 5
To successfully implement the Dodd-Frank Act, regulators
should look to gambling law for guidance. Gambling law can serve
as a useful framework for implementing the Dodd-Frank Act and
can aid administrators in their pursuit of reforming the securities
laws and the regulation of securitization.16 Gambling law provides
proper oversight of regulated activities, addresses the possibility of
systemic risk build-up resulting from gambling enterprises, and
contemplates gambler irrationalities.17 State gaming agencies ad-
dress these issues by promulgating rules and regulations consider-
ing perspectives of economics, psychology, and sociology.18 These
11. See Richard E. Mendales, Collateralized Explosive Devices, Why Securities Regu-
lation Failed to Prevent the CDO Meltdown, and How to Fix It, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. 1359,
1360-61 (2009) (acknowledging imperative need "to analyze the causes of a break-
down in the intended function of protective law after its occurrence, and to pro-
pose changes in the law to prevent it from recurring"); see also David Leonhardt,
The Big Fix, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, at MM22 (quoting President Obama's Chief
of Staff Rahm Emanuel, stating "you never want a serious crisis to go to waste").
12. See The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203 (July 21, 2010) (reforming securities laws).
13. BARACK OBAMA, Remarks by the President at Signing of Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, White House (July 21, 2010), http://www.white
house.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signing-dodd-frank-wall-street-re-
form-and-consumer-protection-act.
14. See Schoenbaum, supra note 4, at 25 (illustrating increased jurisdiction of
securities and commodities laws). "Dodd-Frank extends government regulation to
markets for derivatives and [credit-default swaps] for the first time." Id.
15. See Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, An Insider's View of the SEC: Principles to
Guide Reform, 27 CoRP. COUNS. Q. ART. 1, 1-6 (2011) (outlining SEC's goals for
reform).
16. For an analysis of how gambling law can serve as a framework to alter the
securities laws, see infra notes 328-408 and accompanying text.
17. See DAVID MIERs, REGULATING COMMERCIAL GAMBLING: PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE 2 (2004) (discussing factors that influence how gambling regulation is
promulgated and established).
18. See id. at 3 (analyzing gambling regulation and its contemplation of eco-
nomic, social and psychological policy considerations).
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public policy perspectives influence state gaming agencies to regu-
late in a manner that protects gambling participants, maintains the
welfare of the surrounding community, and ensures the stability of
the economy.19 Had a regulatory structure similar to gambling law
been governing debt securitization, the severity of the financial cri-
sis would have been largely diminished.20
This comment suggests that (1) the investment banking indus-
try's creation and sale of structured products requires additional
oversight, (2) utilizing aspects of gambling law could provide the
necessary oversight to circumvent, or at least decrease, the negative
externalities created by the abuse of securitization, and (3) employ-
ing gambling regulation as a framework to alter the securities laws
is justifiable given (a) the similarities between gambling and struc-
tured investment speculation, and (b) gambling regulation's ability
to decrease externalities caused by securitization.
Part II of this comment describes securitization, the structured
products created through securitization, their role in incentivizing
sub-prime lending, and their creation of systemic risk.21 Part III
analyzes the applicability of a gambling law framework to structured
product transactions by demonstrating the similarity between the
regulated activities and the behavior of each activity's partici-
pants.22 Part IV contrasts gambling law with securities regulation
and analyzes each regime's effectiveness in addressing behavioral
19. See id. at 4-5 (claiming that legal control can circumvent many externali-
ties associated with gambling).
20. See generally Hazen I, supra note 10, at 375-401 (discussing gambling, insur-
ance, securities and derivatives, similarities between these activities, and contrast-
ing regulatory regimes); see also Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investments,
Speculation, or Gambling?: Derivative Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effect on
the Underlying Capital Markets, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 987, 987-1037 (1992) [hereinafter
Hazen II] (detailing premises underlying derivatives and gambling regulation and
activities' effect on capital markets); Christine Hurt, Regulating Public Morals and
Private Markets: Online Securities Trading, Internet Gambling, and the Speculation Para-
dox, 86 B.U. L. REV. 371, 371-441 (2006) (analyzing gambling, investing and law's
harsh treatment of gambling); Christopher T. Pickens, Of Bookies and Brokers: Are
Sports Futures Gambling or Investing, and Does It Even Matter?, 14 GEO. MASON L. REv.
227, 227-70 (2006) (arguing that sports futures should be regulated under securi-
ties laws); Michael C. Macchiarola, Securities Linked to the Perfomance of Tiger Woods?
Not Such a Long Shot, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 29-82 (2008) (proposing that sports
wagers can be regulated under structured product framework); Theresa A.
Gabaldon, John Law, With a Tulip, in the South Seas: Gambling and the Regulation of
Euphoric Market Transactions, 26 J. CORP. L. 225, 225-84 (2001) (explaining models
of regulation are not capable of addressing behavior of gamblers and investors).
21. For an overview of the financial crisis and the role of structured products
assumed, see infra notes 26-144 and accompanying text.
22. For an analysis of the similarities between speculating on the value of
structured investments and gambling, see infra notes 145-237 and accompanying
text.
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and cognitive irrationalities and systemic risk creation.2 3 Part V in-
vokes typical provisions of gambling law to propose a method of
increased and effective oversight of securitization.24 Part VI briefly
concludes and discusses the possible results of utilizing gambling
law as a framework to provide structured products with an in-
creased level of oversight. 25
II. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE ROLE
OF STRUCTURED PRODUCTS
A. Overview of the Financial Crisis
The current recession and credit-freeze is part of the "most se-
vere financial crisis since the Great Depression."2 6 This on-going
financial crisis is the result of investment banks' inability or unwill-
ingness to extend credit to individuals and businesses.27 The larg-
est investment banks have been left without the capital or
confidence to provide financing at reasonable levels to keep the
United States economy afloat.28 Accordingly, every business and in-
23. For an examination of gambling and securities regulation and each of the
regimes' ability to address behavioral and cognitive irrationalities and systemic risk
creation, see infra notes 238-329 and accompanying text.
24. For an analysis of ways securities law could be improved in order to ad-
dress behavioral and cognitive irrationalities and systemic risk, see infra notes 330-
408 and accompanying text.
25. For concluding remarks and possible benefits of reworked securities regu-
latory framework, see infra notes 409-417 and accompanying text.
26. John Hilsenrath et al., Worst Crisis Since '30s, With No End Yet in Sight, WALL
ST.J., Sept. 18, 2008, at Al. See Bob Willis, US. Recession Worst Since Great Depression,
Revised Data Show, BLOOMBERG L.P. (Aug. 1, 2009, 12:00 EDT), http://www.bloom
berg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aNivTjr852TI (explaining why this re-
cession is worst since great depression); Walden Siew, Great Recession, seen lasting
three years experts say, THOMSON REUTERs (Feb. 12 2009, 9:53 AM) http://www.
reuters.com/article/idUSTRE51B45820090212 (describing current recession and
predicting its length).
27. See Peter S. Goodman, Credit Enters a Lockdown, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2008,
at Al (describing credit freeze and its cause of financial crisis); David Cho & Biny-
amin Appelbaum, Tipping Point? Unfolding Worldwide Turmoil Could Reverse Years of
Prosperity, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2008/10/06/AR2008100603249.html?sid=ST2008100603283 (dis-
cussing need for government to provide banks with liquidity in order to ensure
economic recovery). The on-going financial crisis refers to the persistent credit
freeze. See id. (acknowledging Americans' inability to access credit). At first, when
investment banks incurred extreme losses as a result of their securitization prac-
tices, the bank's inability to extend credit was understandable given the banks' lack
of liquidity. See id. (noting investment banks' large losses). Perplexing, however, is
the persistent failure of the investment banks to extend credit after the United
States government infused the investment banks with approximately 700 billion
dollars of liquidity. See id. (explaining government bailout).
28. See William Collins, Developments in Banking and Financial Law: 2007-2008:
IV Valuing Opaque Assets in an Illiquid Market, 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 285, 285-90
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dividual that relies on credit has been adversely affected.29 The ad-
verse effects of the current credit freeze are numerous. They
include, inter alia, the following: American businesses filing for
bankruptcy at increased rates; consumer spending plummeting; un-
employment rates skyrocketing; and, the disappearance of em-
ployee retirement and pension funds due to the evaporation of the
stock market's value.30 To effectively reform structured product
regulation to prevent another severe recession, the causes of the
financial crisis and the reasons why Americans are now unable to
gain credit must first be explained.31
(2008) (discussing how lack of liquidity in banking system adversely affects remain-
der of economy because of inability to gain credit). When the housing market
collapsed, banks were unable to extend credit because of their obligations to credi-
tors; however, even when the government provided the banking system with 700
billion dollars in liquidity the banking system remained frozen, failing to release
funds. See Michael R. Crittenden & Meena Thiruvengadam, Treasury Finds No Rise
in Bank Lending, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2009 (noting banks' refusal to lend despite
infusion of capital from government bail-out plan); Michael Lewis & David Ein-
horn, The End of the Financial World As We Know It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at WK9
(noting banks' failure to lend).
29. See Brian Perry, Credit Crisis, Market Effects, INVESTOPEDIA ULC., http://
www.investopedia.com/university/credit-crisis/credit-crisis7.asp (last visited Mar.
1, 2011) (discussing effects of credit crisis on businesses and individuals); Jeannine
Aversa, Fed: Credit Crunch Effects Limited, WASH. PosT (Sept. 5, 2007, 6:42 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/05/AR2007
090501698.html (explaining adverse effects individuals and business are exper-
iencing due to credit crunch).
30. See Americans' Wealth Drops to $1.3 trillion: Fed Report Shows a Decline of Home
Values and the Stock Market Cut the Nation's Wealth to $50.4 trillion, CABLE NEWS NET-
woRK (CNN) (June 11, 2009), http://money.cnn.com/2009/06/11/news/econ-
omy/Americans wealth drops/?postversion=2009061113 (describing Americans
loss of 1.3 trillion dollars in net worth due to mortgage market crisis); Realty Trac
Inc., U.S. Foreclosure Activity Increase 75 Percent in 2007 (Jan. 29. 2008), http://
www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/us-foreclosure-activity-increases-75-
percent-in-2007-3604 (noting 75% increase in foreclosure filings from 2006 to
2007 and 150% increase in foreclosure filings from 2005-2007); Justin Lahart, Egg
Cracks Differ in Housing, Finance Shells, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2007, at C1 (demon-
strating large decrease in home building by stating "[t]he DowJones Wilshire in-
dex of home-building shares had fallen 41% from its July 2005 peak"); Burton
Frierson, Consumers Cut Spending, THOMSON REuTERS (Nov. 26, 2008), http://www.
reuters.com/article/idUSN2633812620081126?loomia-ow--t0:s0:a49:g43:r1:cl.000
000:b30373636:zO (describing consumer spending decrease); Louis Uchitelle, job-
less Rate Hits 7.2%, a 16-Year High, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2009 at Al (noting increas-
ing unemployment rates caused by credit freeze); see also Moira Herbst, Even the
Employed Lose With Hours and Wage Cuts, BLOOMBERG L.P. (July 10, 2009, 7:54 PM),
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/jul2009/
db20090710_255918.htm (explaining increase in wage cuts); Alexandra Twin,
Stocks Crushed, CABLE NEWS NETWORK (CNN) (Sept. 29, 2008), http://
money.cnn.com/2008/09/29/markets/markets newyork/ (explaining stock mar-
ket crash caused by mortgage market crisis).
31. See, e.g., Moran, supra note 5, at 5-54 (explaining how interest rate reduc-
tions, predatory lending, and securitization contributed to cause credit freeze); see
also Morrissey, supra note 8, at 647-50 (2010) (describing securitized products role
9
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B. Causes of the Financial Crisis and the
On-Going Credit Freeze
From the early 1990's through 2008, many individuals and
businesses became overleveraged and saturated with debt.3 2 Der-
egulation of financial markets, decreased interest rates, irresponsi-
ble lending standards, and investment bank securitization were all
proximate causes of the enormous volume of credit that was ex-
tended to sub-prime borrowers.33 One of the most notable effects
of the lenient credit standards during this period was a rapid in-
in credit crisis); Mendales, supra note 11, at 1359-00 (2009) (explaining structured
products role in financial crisis); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Risky Business: The Credit
Crisis and Failure (Part I), 104 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 398, 400-18 (2010) (dem-
onstrating structured products involvement in financial crisis); Olufunmilayo B.
Arewa, Risky Business: The Credit Crisis and Failure (Part II), 104 Nw. U. L. REv. CoL-
LOQuy 421, 422-38 (2010) (discussing role of deregulation in financial crisis);
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Risky Business: The Credit Crisis and Failure (Part III), 104
Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 441, 441-50 (2010) (suggesting framework for securities
regulation); Michael Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis, 83 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 253, 253-87 (2009) (discussing priority structured products received in bank-
ruptcy claims); AndrewJ. Ceresney et al., Regulatory Investigations and the Credit Cri-
sis: The Search for Villains, 46 AM. CRIm. L. REv. 225, 225-70 (2009) (describing
origins of financial crisis); Lisa Sutton, The Roots of the Credit Crunch, 28 REv. BANK-
ING & FIN. L. 3, 3-10 (2009) (outlining financial crisis); Joseph Karl Grant, What the
Financial Services Industry Puts Together Let No Person Put Asunder- How the Gramm-
Leach Bliley Act Contributed to the 2008-2009 American Market Crisis, 73 ALB. L. REv.
371, 373-16 (2010) (explaining how mixing commercial and investment banking
functions enabled credit freeze to unfold); Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering
the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008, 23 J. EcoN. PERSP. 77, 78-87 (2009) (ex-
plaining multiple variables that led to credit crisis). For a discussion of the credit
crisis and its origins, see infra notes 51-144 and accompanying text.
32. See Moran, supra note 5, at 16-22 (discussing extreme levels of debt indi-
viduals were assuming); Wilmarth Jr., supra note 6, at 969 (detailing credit boom
that occurred in America from 1992-2007). Wilmarth explains that from 1992-
2007, domestic household debt grew from 3.8 trillion to 13.8 trillion, nonfinancial
business debt grew from 3.7 trillion to 10.1 trillion, and financial sector debt in-
creased from 2.8 trillion to 15.8 trillion. See id. at 969 (noting volume of sub-prime
mortgages being extended and high default rate).
33. See Moran, supra note 5, at 13-35 (citing causes of credit boom). Moran
explains that the root of the financial crisis began in mid 1990's during the
dot.com bubble. See id. at 13 (explaining how dot.com bubble influenced federal
reserve to cut interest rates). The large interest rate cuts made mortgage payments
cheaper, causing a huge demand increase for real estate, and accordingly the rise
in housing prices, and the creation of a speculative housing bubble. See id.
(describing burst of housing bubble when federal reserve raised interest rates back
to normal levels). Moran also described predatory lending and its influence of the
credit boom by stating that 'home buyers betting on continued house price appre-
ciation took out sizeable loans with little or no documentation, no down payment,
or without the income to qualify for a conventional loan of the size they wanted."
Id. at 17 (noting that predatory lending coupled with interest rate cuts caused
strong increase in sub-prime lending). For a discussion of the role of securitiza-
tion in incentivizing credit boom and sub-prime lending, see infra notes 51-144
and accompanying text.
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crease in the demand for housing.34 The supply of housing during
this period, however, remained relatively constant.35 The resulting
imbalance in supply and demand caused housing prices to rise ac-
cordingly, creating a housing bubble.3 6 Investment banks magni-
fied the risks associated with subprime loans and the housing
bubble by creating investment opportunities derived from the value
of the underlying mortgages.37 These structured products com-
bined with the interconnectedness of the United States' investment
banking system exposed the economy to an extreme amount of sys-
temic risk.38
Prior to the financial crisis, structured products were perceived
as extremely low-risk investments because the packaged mortgages
were secured by underlying real estate values.39 Moreover, seeming
to be acting as intermediaries between commercial lenders and in-
stitutional investors, investment banks merely packaged and sold
pools of loans, leaving large amounts of debt remaining on invest-
ment banks' balance sheets. 40 In 2007, the number of individuals
34. See Wilmarth Jr., supra note 6, at 1002 (describing large increase in con-
sumer debt, demand for housing, and inevitable increase in housing prices)
35. See id. (noting constant supply of housing).
36. See Henry Blodget, The Housing Chart That's Worth 1000 Words, Bus. INSIDER
(Feb. 21, 2009), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-housing-chart-thats-worth-
1000-words-2009-2 (demonstrating rise and subsequent fall of housing prices de-
stroying creditors' security interests in borrowers' debt).
37. See WilmarthJr., supra note 6, at 1030 (noting that "total volume of finan-
cial instruments with exposures to nonprime mortgages was at least twice as large
as the $2 trillion of outstanding nonprime mortgages").
38. See id. at 994-95 (explaining large banks' originate to distribute model and
their creation of extensive amount of leverage exposed to subprime mortgages).
Large banks originated loans, packaged the loans into mortgage-backed securities,
packaged mortgage-backed securities into tranches of collateralized debt obliga-
tions, packaged certain tranches of collateralized debt obligations into squared col-
lateralized debt obligations, and facilitated bets on all of these financial products
through the use of synthetic collateralized debt obligations. See id. (noting that
amount of leverage created was immense and was all based on the subprime mort-
gages that would eventually default).
39. See Moran, supra note 5, at 17 ("One unfortunate consequence of the in-
flation of the housing market was that mortgage brokers came to view their loans
as well-secured by the rising values of their real estate collateral and, therefore,
failed to focus sufficiently on borrowers' ability to repay.").
40. See Wilmarth Jr. supra note 6, at 1032-33 (explaining large banks exposure
to risks based upon amount of subprime loans banks maintained on their books).
Accordingly, when the mortgage market burst, the loans and financial instruments
that large banks had not sold became the bank's liabilities causing the banks to
incur large losses and leading to the credit freeze. See Moran, supra note 5, at 71
("Uncertainty over the quantity and valuation of banks' 'toxic assets' has meant
that many institutions could not count on loans from each other to meet daily
needs, and this illiquidity in the markets has impaired their ability and willingness
to lend.").
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who defaulted on their loans began increasing significantly.4 ' In
turn, institutional investors and investments banks were not af-
forded the interest and principal payments that were due to
them.4 2 The common conception, however, was that investment
banks and investors could simply foreclose on the homes serving as
collateral, sell them for their market value, and suffer no legitimate
loss. 43
That conception holds true only to the extent that housing
prices continue to increase. 4 4 When more and more borrowers de-
faulted, however, and a larger proportion of real estate became
foreclosed upon, the demand for housing evaporated while the sup-
ply for housing remained abundant. 45 This supply and demand
shift resulted in a steep downturn in housing prices and caused the
value of institutional investors' and investments banks' security in-
terests to essentially disappear.46
As a result, investment banks were unable to collect payments
from debtors and recuperate their investments through foreclosure
due to the decreased value of the real estate collateral.4 7 Accord-
ingly, investment banks lost an extraordinary amount of capital and
are currently unwilling to extend credit to individuals and busi-
nesses.4 8 Thus, the investment banks, which played a primary role
41. SeeJames MacGee, Why Didn't Canada's Housing Market Go Bust?, FED. RES.
BANK CLEVELAND (Dec. 12, 2009), http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/com-
mentary/2009/0909.cfm (supplying chart showing spike in United States delin-
quency rate on loans from under 0.5% in 2007 to over 2.2% in 2009).
42. See Wilmarth Jr., supra note 6, at 1032-33 (noting banks losses as cause of
credit freeze).
43. See Moran, supra note 5, at 17 ("One unfortunate consequence of the in-
flation of the housing market was that mortgage brokers came to view their loans
as well-secured by the rising values of their real estate collateral and, therefore
failed to focus sufficiently on borrowers' ability to repay.").
44. See id. (explaining that security interests were only valuable to extent that
housing maintained value).
45. See id. at 54 ("When the speculative fever finally broke in America's hous-
ing industry and housing prices began falling in search of equilibrium levels, banks
and financial institutions everywhere suffered defaults and subsequent losses on a
range of assets.").
46. See Tim lacono, Existing Home Sales Continue to Improve, SEEKING ALPHA
(July 23, 2009), http://seekingalpha.com/article/150923-existing-home-sales-con-
tinue-to-improve (providing chart showing demand and supply shift for housing
and explaining price consequences).
47. See Eggert, supra note 5, at 1261 ("Increasing subprime defaults and plum-
meting housing prices have caused enormous losses for many financial institutions
and shaken the confidence of many investors in the credit markets generally.").
48. See Moran, supra note 5, at 55 (stating that "[t]he losses on these widely
held mortgage-related investments have created an enormous capital hole on the
balance sheet of many financial institutions" and that losses left banks without suf-
ficient capital to lend). See also Neel Kashkari, Interim Assistance Secretary for Finan-
[Vol. 18: p. 569
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in causing the mortgage market meltdown, were the entities most
affected by the collapse. 49 Investment banks were the architects of
their own destruction, leaving the U.S. economy and American citi-
zens to toil in the rubble.5 0
C. Securitization, the Resulting Products, and Their Dual-Role
in Influencing the Financial Crisis
Securitization influenced the credit freeze and the financial
crisis in two main ways. 5 ' First, large investment banks pursued an
originate-to-distribute ("OTD") model of securitization that incen-
tivized mortgagors to lend at increased levels and to less qualified
cial Stability Neel Kashkari Review of the Financial Market Crisis and the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (Jan. 13, 2009), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-re-
leases/Pages/hp1349.aspx (stating that "[c]apital is essential for a healthy finan-
cial system"). Kashkari explained why capital is important to the banking system
by stating that:
[Capital] permits banks to take risks and absorb losses while honoring
their obligations to depositors and other creditors. During an economic
downturn, many businesses and consumers want to see their extra capital
in their bank in order to have confidence the bank is sound and their
money safe. Similarly, in such times, many banks want to see increased
capital in other banks in order to have confidence to do business with
them.
Id.
49. See Moran supra note 5, at 54 ("When the speculative fever finally broke in
America's housing industry and housing prices began falling in search of equilib-
rium levels, banks and financial institutions everywhere suffered defaults and sub-
sequent losses on a range of assets."). Investment banks incentivized the boom of
subprime lending that was at the core of the mortgage market collapse. See id.
(explaining investment banks' role in financial crisis). Investment banks took a
large hit because of their creation of structured products and the risk they main-
tained on their books. See id. at 71 ("Uncertainty over the quantity and valuation
of banks' 'toxic assets' has meant that many institutions could not count on loans
from each other to meet daily needs, and this illiquidity in the markets has im-
paired their ability and willingness to lend."). The banks lack capital and are ac-
cordingly cautious concerning the state of the economy because of the large
financial hit they took when the mortgage market collapsed. See Wilmarth Jr.,
supra note 6, at 1032-33 (explaining large financial loss banks sustained).
50. See Alan C. Harrell, The Great Credit Contraction: Who, What, When, Where,
and Why?, 26 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 1209, 1239-49 (2010) (explaining credit freeze and
its implications).
51. See generally, Adam B. Ashcraft & Til Schuermann, Understanding the Securi-
tization of Subprime Mortgage Credit, Fed. Res. Bank N.Y. Staff Rep. No. 318, at 1-76
(2008), available at, http://www.ny.frb.org/research/staffreports/sr318.pdf (dis-
cussing seven frictions of securitization and their influence of financial crisis); see
also Antje Berndt & Anurag Gupta, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in the Origi-
nate-to-Distribute Model of Bank Credit, 1-39 (Working Paper, Nov. 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1290312 (explaining origi-
nate to distribute model and its influence of subprime mortgage market collapse).
For a discussion of how securitization influenced subprime lending and the finan-
cial crisis, see infra notes 52-144 and accompanying text.
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applicants. 52 Through securitization, commercial banks were af-
forded more liquidity and assumed less default risk; as a result,
commercial banks extended more credit and screened loan appli-
cants less thoroughly.53 Second, investment banks created struc-
tured products that exposed themselves, as well as many
institutional investors, to the serious risks associated with the over-
extension of subprime mortgages. 54 By packaging mortgages, pack-
aging packages of mortgages, and packaging packages of packages
of mortgages, investment banks increased the economy's exposure
to the risks associated with subprime mortgages exponentially.5 5
An analysis of the OTD model and the products created through
52. See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 971.
In both markets, as with home mortgages, securitization created perverse
incentives for lenders and [asset-backed security] underwriters. Lenders
and [asset-backed-security] underwriters believed that they could (i) orig-
inate risky loans without properly screening borrowers and (ii) avoid
costly post-loan monitoring of the borrowers' behavior because . . . the
loans were transferred to investors.
Id. The OTD model was sustained by investment banks' securitization activities.
See id. at 969.
The [originate-to-distribute] model included (i) originating and servicing
consumer and corporate loans, (ii) packaging those loans into [asset-
backed securities] and [collateralized debt obligations], (iii) creating ad-
ditional financial instruments, including synthetic [collateralized debt ob-
ligations] and credit default swaps . . . and (iv) distributing the foregoing
securities and financial instruments to investors.
Id. This process involved originating loans from individuals and businesses, pack-
aging loans into structured products, selling them to investors and creating other
over-the counter-derivatives that served as financial bets on the value of these un-
derlying loans and structured products. See Arnold Kling, An Economy In Crisis:
Law, Policy, and Morality During the Recession: Essay: The Financial Crisis: Moral Failure
or Cognitive Failure?, 33 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 507, 507-08 (2010) (noting origi-
nate-to-distribute model's ability to incentivize sub-prime lending and create sys-
temic risk). Mr. Kling notes that:
Those who emphasize moral failure have highlighted a number of distor-
tions between private and social benefits, including: that executive pay at
financial institutions is not tied to long term viability, the "originate to
distribute" model of mortgage financing gives the originator an incentive
to make bad loans that are passed down the line in the system of struc-
tured financing of mortgage securities, and rating agencies are overly
generous in granting AAA and AA ratings because they were paid by the
issuers of mortgage-related securities.
Id.
53. See id. at 508-09 ("[T]he financial crisis was like a fire started by delin-
quent teenagers, with the adults in charge not sufficiently inclined or positioned to
exercise adequate supervision.").
54. See Moran, supra note 5, at 51 (explaining that "the financial turmoil is the
aftermath of a credit boom characterized by the underpricing of risk, excessive
leverage, and an increasing reliance on complex and opaque financial instruments
that have proved to be extremely fragile under stress").
55. See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 1027-28 (explaining how investment banks
creation of structured products created large amounts of systemic risk).
14
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol18/iss2/8
2011]"ROLLING THE DICE" ON FINANCIAL REGUIATORY REFORm 583
securitization is imperative to understand how these products in-
centivized subprime lending and exposed the economy to large
amounts of systemic risk.56
1. Securitization and the Structured Products Created Through
Securitization
Securitization involves pooling and packaging mortgaged loans
into securities that investors purchase in order to receive the princi-
pal and interest payments from a set of mortgages.57 The securitiza-
tion process generally proceeds as follows: an "originator," often a
commercial bank, underwrites and services mortgages to borrowers
who are in need of credit to purchase property, in this case real
estate.58 The originator then enters into a transaction with a bank
or institution called the "arranger," which may be part of the same
institution as the originator.59 The arranger purchases a pool of
loans from the originator by paying the originator a premium on
the amount of capital extended to borrowers.60 The originator has
an incentive to sell these loans to the arranger because, upon sale,
the risk of default is transferred to the arranger and the originator
is afforded a risk-free return for servicing and underwriting the
mortgages. 61
The arranger then begins soliciting individual and institutional
investors to purchase the pools of loans in security-form. 62 While
the details of securitization are being finalized, the arranger "ware-
56. For a discussion of the incentives to lend created by certain OTD prod-
ucts, see infra notes 57-144 and accompanying text.
57. See CHRISTINE A. PAVEL, SECURITIZATION, THE ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE LOAN-BASED/ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES MARKETS 3 (1989) (defining securi-
tization as "the pooling and repackaging of loans into securities that are then sold
to investors").
58. See Aschcraft, supra note 51 (discussing roles in OTD process). An "origi-
nator" is the person or entity that disperses funds to the borrower and services the
loan. See id. (announcing originator's functions).
59. See id. (describing loan process). An "arranger," often an investment
bank, is the entity that purchases mortgages from the originator and creates the
special purpose vehicle that houses the pool of mortgages in ways that enable the
issuance of structured products. See id. (discussing role of arranger in securitiza-
tion process).
60. See id. (explaining purchasing, pooling and packaging process of ar-
ranger). For instance, an originator who extended credit in the amount of
$100,000 to a pool of borrowers may accept $105,000 from an arranger to achieve
liquidity to issue more loans and protection from risk of default. See id. (examin-
ing benefits of securitization to originator).
61. See id. (illustrating risk-transfer and capital infusion securitization provides
to originating banks).
62. See id. at 6 (recognizing arrangers' function of soliciting and arranging
sales of pools of loans in form of securities).
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houses" the pools of loans and is responsible for any funding and
liable for any losses incurred by the mortgages.63 Once the details
of the transactions are worked out with investors, the pool of loans
is transferred to a special purpose vehicle that simultaneously
shields the loans from the debts of the arranger and insulates the
arranger from liability resulting from the loans.64 A third party in-
vestor then pays the arranger a transaction fee and possibly a lump
sum premium over the "par value" of the loans to secure rights to
the payments. 65 The rights to payments that accrue from the pool
of loans in the special purpose vehicle are what is commonly re-
ferred to as a structured product or securitized investment. 66
The arranger often hires a "servicer" who manages the pay-
ments to and from the special purpose vehicle.67 The servicer is
responsible for, among other things, collecting loan payments,
making advances of unpaid interest payments to those investing in
the structured product, supervising foreclosures on real estate col-
lateral, and selling the foreclosed upon collateral.68
This entire process is often consolidated and streamlined by
investment banks that participate in many levels of the securitiza-
tion process.69 For example, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., an
investment bank which participated heavily in securitized invest-
63. See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 1028-30 (recognizing investment bank prac-
tices to provide bridge financing and warehousing pools of loans exposing them-
selves to sub-prime risk). Warehousing pools of loans is the process of maintaining
loans on investment banks' balance sheets until they can solicit investors to
purchase the mortgage-backed securities. See id. (surveying systemic risk created
through process of warehousing).
64. See PAVEL, supra note 57, at 23 (stating that pools of loans are usually sold
by originator to "special purpose vehicles" created by investment banks). "Special
purpose vehicle" is a bankruptcy remote trust created by investment banks. See id.
(commenting that special purpose vehicle is created specifically to hold pools of
loans and issue payments from loans). These trusts are usually set up as a separate
business entity such as a limited purpose corporation and shield the assets from
the investment banks and investors liabilities. See id. (describing special purpose
vehicle and its purposes of shielding pool of loans from investor liability).
65. See id. at 34-35 (indicating investors interest in purchasing rights to pay-
ments because they could achieve fairly high return for perceived low risk).
66. See id. at 23-24 (discussing sale of assets from special purpose vehicle).
67. See id. at 22-23 (describing function and duties of servicer).
68. See id. at 24-26 (indicating servicer's responsibilities and noting that ser-
vicer's and arranger's functions may be assumed by investment bank).
69. See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 963-65 (explaining that investment banks
"pursued an "originate to distribute" strategy, which included (i) originating con-
sumer and corporate loans, (ii) packaging loans into ABS and CDOs, (iii) creating
OTC derivatives whose values were derived from loans, and (iv) distributing the
resulting securities and other financial instruments to investors").
[Vol. 18: p. 569
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ments, often acted as originator, arranger, and servicer.70 This con-
solidation is a key characteristic of the OTD model and played a
major role in influencing the credit-boom and systemic risk crea-
tion.71 The basic types and forms of structured products created
through the OTD model are outlined below. 72
a. Mortgage-Backed Securities
Mortgage-Backed Securities ("MBSs") are securities that afford
investors rights to principal and interest payments from a pool of
mortgages that are "backed" or "secured" by real estate collateral.73
Investors who purchase MBSs receive cash payments due from the
pool of mortgages, assume the risk of borrower default, and retain a
security interest in the real estate collateral underlying the
mortgages.74
MBSs can be structured in a variety of ways.75 The most basic
form of MBS is the "pass-through" MBS, which is appropriately la-
beled because principal and interest payments literally pass
through from the borrower, to the originator, to the arranger, and
70. See id. (surveying functions assumed by investment banks). Lehman
Brothers would serve as the originator, lend large sums of money to borrowers,
step into the shoes of the arranger, solicit institutional investors seeking to gain
exposure to pools of mortgages and eventually sell the loans to a special purpose
vehicle created by the banks for the purposes of the transaction. See id. (explain-
ing consolidation of OTD process by investment banks). Lehman Brothers would
also act as servicer for the structured products, monitoring payments and defaults
on loans and making advances of unpaid interest payments. See id. (noting invest-
ment banks' assumption of role of servicer in OTD model of securitization).
71. See id. (indicating that originate-to-distribute model incentivized sub-
prime lending and increased systemic risk). Investment banks had incentives to
keep the system going, and continue originating, arranging and servicing, in order
to maintain high transaction fees. See id. (asserting need to realign investment
banks' interests with overall economy).
72. For an outline of the basic types of structured products, see infra notes 73-
118 and accompanying text.
73. See Moran, supra note 5, at 36 (outlining characteristics and functions of
mortgage-backed securities). For instance, an investor of a mortgage-backed se-
curity generally pays a series of transaction fees or a lump-sum fee in order to gain
the rights to principal and interest payments of mortgages. See id. (explaining
MBSs). These rights also include security interests in the collateral underlying the
mortgages, which is what made these investments seemingly risk-free and very ap-
pealing. See id. (explaining demand for MBSs).
74. See id. (detailing mortgage-backed securities as ways for institutional inves-
tors to assume risk of loan default in exchange for principal and interest payments
on loans).
75. See id. at 36-37 (outlining various structures of mortgage-backed
securities).
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subsequently to the investors who purchase the MBSs. 76 All of the
purchasers of a particular MBS are entitled to a pro-rata share of
the principal and interest payments made by the borrowers as well
as the proceeds from foreclosures on the collateral.77
b. Collateralized Mortgage Obligations
Some MBSs, however, are structured in ways that account for
investors' risk preferences by providing investors with claims to spe-
cific portions of the pools of loans.78 MBSs structured in this man-
ner are called Collateralized Mortgage Obligations ("CMOs").7
CMOs divide pools of loans into maturity classes known as
"Tranches."80 Each maturity class or tranche has different risks,
maturity dates, rights to payments, and responsibility for debt.8 1
CMOs are often broken up into a senior tranche, mezzanine
tranche, and equity tranche.82 Investors with rights in the senior
76. See id. (analyzing pass-through mortgage-backed securities by explaining
that "mortgage loans are pooled into a trust by a mortgage loan originator, which
then sells interests in the trust to certain investors-certificate holders").
77. See Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMOs), SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://
www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (explain-
ing mortgage-backed securities); see also Moran, supra note 5, at 37 (detailing bene-
fits of mortgage-backed securities).
78. See Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs), SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http:/
/www.sec.gov/answers/tcmos.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (commenting on
characteristics of collateralized mortgage obligations).
79. See Moran, supra note 5, at 378 (detailing characteristics of CMOs).
80. See id. (noting that these securities are similar to mortgage-backed securi-
ties, but are just structured differently). Collateralized Mortgage Obligations
(CMOs), a type of mortgage-backed security, are bonds that represent claims to
specific cash flows from large pools of home mortgages. See id. (detailing differ-
ences between pass-through MBSs and CMOs). The streams of principal and inter-
est payments on the mortgages are distributed to the different classes of CMO
interests, known as tranches, according to a complicated deal structure. See id.
(noting investment banks custom of creating tranches of assets when pooling loans
into CMOs). Each tranche may have different principal balances, coupon rates,
prepayment risks, and maturity dates, ranging from a few months to twenty years.
See id. (explaining that senior tranche is lowest risk because it is first to receive
payments and last to become liable for default losses).
81. See id. (explaining division of structured products into tranches). Moran
states that:
these securities are divided into various tranches that receive credit rat-
ings from credit rating agencies. These ratings ranged from senior
tranches (rated AAA), mezzanine tranches (AA to BB), to equity tranches
(unrated). The cash flows of principal and interest payments from each
tranche are paid out by order of priority in a predetermined order, with
the most risky tranches receiving payment last but benefitting from the
highest interest rates.
Id.
82. See id. (stating that senior tranches were viewed as extremely low risk in-
vestments that afforded higher return than risk-free government bonds).
[Vol. 18: p. 569
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tranche of CMOs assume the least amount of risk because the se-
nior tranche has shorter expected "maturity periods" and first right
to principal and interest payments.83 The mezzanine tranche col-
lects after the senior tranche, and the equity tranche collects after
the mezzanine tranche.84 Conversely, losses resulting from CMOs
are incurred first by the equity tranche, second by the mezzanine
tranche, and last by the senior tranche.85 Due to the increased de-
fault and interest rate risk the mezzanine and equity tranches as-
sume, the equity tranche earns a higher rate of return than the
mezzanine tranche and the mezzanine tranche earns a higher rate
of return than the senior tranche.86 Thus, investors are able to
structure investments in CMOs according to their risk-reward
preferences.87
c. Collateralized Debt Obligations
MBSs and CMOs provided originators with additional capital
to lend and accordingly afforded arrangers new mortgages to pack-
age into MBSs and CMOs.88 Eventually, however, financial innova-
tion was needed to satisfy the seemingly perpetual investor demand
for rights to principal and interest payments. 89 Collateralized Debt
Obligations ("CDOs") were created to satisfy this demand. 90 CDOs
83. See id. (outlining rights of senior tranche of CMOs). The maturity date is
the date a bond matures or is paid off. See id. (explaining maturity date).
84. See id. (explaining waterfall concept of CMOs).
85. See id. (explaining desirability to invest in senior tranche of structured
products).
86. See id. (detailing risk-return of mezzanine and equity tranches). The eq-
uity tranche, for example, because of its longer maturity date and subordinated
priority to payments, is exposed to a heightened level of default and interest rate
risk and because of this increased risk exposure, is afforded a higher interest rate
and higher rate of return. See id. (explaining inverse relationship of risk and
return).
87. See id. (noting that investors who seek higher rates of return preferred
mezzanine and equity tranches and assumed greater amount of risk).
88. See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 969-71 (demonstrating investment banks'
desire to collect large transaction fees by innovating new financial instruments to
structure and sell).
89. See id. (explaining investment banks' innovation of financial products to
satisfy demand for debt securities).
90. See Moran, supra note 5, at 38-40 (examining features of CDOs that made
these structured products extremely attractive to many investors). Moran notes
that investment banks wanted to maintain the income from transaction fees and
thus innovated additional structured products to enable them to sell even more
securities referencing the same underlying assets; Moran stated: "[flurther ex-
panding the potential investor base was the development of another structured
product, collateralized debt obligations (CDOS), which are used to purchase asset-
backed instruments such as MBSs or CMOs with various ratings and projected re-
turns" and sell rights to these payments to institutional investors. See id. at 38 (sur-
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are similar in structure to CMOs and are broken up into senior,
mezzanine, and equity tranches.9' CDOs, however, are constructed
by forming a portfolio of a variety of debt obligations, including
particular tranches of MBSs and CMOs. 9 2 Typically, CDOs are con-
structed by pooling securities with the lowest credit ratings in a stra-
tegic manner in order to increase the credit rating of the resulting
financial product.93 By combining a variety of types and grades of
debt into one pool, investment banks were able to diversify the debt
pool in a way sufficient to achieve investment grade credit ratings.94
This process is termed credit enhancement, and through it, the se-
nior tranche of CDOs was often afforded AAA ratings, notwith-
standing the fact that the CDOs were often comprised of mostly
veying financial innovation that led to sub-prime lending, systemic risk. and
eventual financial crisis).
91. See id. at 39 (stating that CDOs are broken up into tranches with senior
tranche having first rights to payments and final responsibility for losses).
92. See id. at 39-40 (summarizing CDO construction by stating "CDO securities
are arranged by investment banker/securitizer into various tranches with input
from the credit rating agencies. The securities pooled are typically those otherwise
receiving the lowest rating by the credit rating agencies") (emphasis added). Thus,
the worst loans were packaged into securities such as MBSs and CMOs and then
the lowest rated of those securities were packaged into CDOs in a manner warrant-
ing AAA ratings notwithstanding the fact that the assets referenced in these securi-
ties were non-investment grade debt. See id. at 39 (recognizing potential for value
of these securities to crumble). Moran explains the complexity of these securities
by stating that:
[c]ombining different types and grades of debt in one pool, these com-
plex securities were designed to reduce the risk of the whole below the
level of the individual pieces. But as very complex instruments, even the
most sophisticated investors sometimes fail to appreciate their risks and
substitute the rating supplied by the credit agency for the investors' own
independent risk analysis.
Id. at 40.
93. See id. at 39 (delineating ways investment banks used credit enhancements
to achieve AAA ratings on securities referencing other poorly rated securities).
94. See id. (analyzing waterfall structure of CDOs, payments would satisfy debt
of senior tranche first; if there were enough cash left, payments would overflow to
the mezzanine tranche; and if there was cash remaining the payments would over-
flow to equity tranche). Moran explains that this construction caused the senior
tranche to be perceived as extremely low risk by noting that "[t]ypically, the credit
rating agencies, gave a majority of the securities issued an investment grade rating,
despite the fact that the pool backing the securities fell below investment grade,
because they believed that any losses from the pool would be sufficiently covered
by the investors in the lowest tranches." See id. at 40 (detailing transformation from
many non-investment grade securities into one investment grade security). A se-
curity is investment grade when the prospects of payment on the investment are
high; in other words, when a security is likely to pay what is promised to the inves-
tors it will be labeled investment grade. See id. (describing characteristics of invest-
ment-grade securities). Investment grade securities are perceived as low risk, and
are accompanied by a lower interest rate. See HAMILTON, supra note 153, at 473-76
(analyzing investment grade bonds and non-investment grade bonds or "junk
bonds" and explaining risks and rewards of each type of investment).
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non-investment grade CMOs, MBSs, and other debt.9 5 The senior
tranche of CDOs, situated with first priority to payments, last re-
sponsibility for liabilities, and a retained security interest in the col-
lateral was extremely attractive to investors because of the
perception that the senior tranche, was a near risk-free investment
that afforded a higher return than government-backed treasury
notes. 96
The creation of CDOs, however, was not enough to satisfy the
endless investor demand, and to broaden the investor-base even
further, investment banks created Squared CDOs. 9 7 Just as invest-
ment banks assembled low-grade MBSs and CMOs in a manner to
achieve AAA rated senior tranches of CDOs, investment banks as-
sembled lower-rated CDOs into AAA rated senior tranches of
Squared CDOs by diversifying the debt obligations and prioritizing
payments in a subordinated payment structure. 98 In the end, these
95. See PAVEL, supra note 57, at 29-32 (examining investment banking practice
of diversifying debt and establishing rights to payments in order to enhance
creditworthiness of securities). Pavel notes that:
[c]redit enhancement is a vehicle that reduces the overall credit risk of a
security issue. The purpose of the credit enhancement is to improve the
rating, and therefore the pricing and marketability, of an asset-backed
security. . . . Credit has been enhanced by the issuer by providing re-
course, a senior subordinated structure, overcollateralization, or a spread
account.
Id. at 29. A senior-subordinated structure is a credit-enhancement mechanism
where the investment bank creates tranches and assigns rights and responsibilities
to each tranche in a way that lowers risk for senior tranche. See id. (explaining
senior subordinations as credit enhancers and ways they decreases risk).
96. See id. (providing that because of senior tranche's perceived low risk and
high interest rate relative to risk-free government bonds, these investment became
extremely popular among institutional investors).
97. See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 1029 ("Financial conglomerates used the
same re-securitization process to transform mezzanine tranches of CDOs into
higher-rated securities issued by 'CDOs Squared.'").
98. See id. (analyzing credit enhancements and questioning how senior
tranches of squared CDOs achieved AAA ratings when securities consisted of: sub-
prime loans packaged into non-investment grade MBSs and CMOs, that were pack-
aged into mezzanine tranche or non-investment grade CDOs, and subsequently re-
packaged into investment grade squared CDOs). Although beyond the scope of
this Comment, there are many critiques of credit rating agency practices and
whether or not they were incentivized to provide these securities with heightened
ratings because investment banks were paying their compensation. See, e.g., Lynn
Bai, On Regulating Conflicts ofInterest in the Credit rating Industry, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL'Y. 253, 253-13 (2010) (analyzing conflicts of interest within credit rat-
ing agencies); Deryn Darcy, Survey: Credit rating Agencies and the Credit Crisis: How the
"Issuer Pays" Conflict Contributed and What Regulators Might Do About It, 2009 COLUM.
Bus. L. REv. 605, 605-68 (2009) (commenting on "issuer pays" model and discuss-
ing possible regulatory responses in order to remove those conflicts); Timothy E.
Lynch, Deeply and Persistently Conflicted: Credit Rating Agencies in the Current Regulatory
Environment, 59 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 227, 227-04 (2009) (illustrating conflicts of
interest present in credit rating industry).
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debt securities were comprised of extremely risky debt that re-
mained from previous transactions and were disguised as valuable,
safe investments.99
d. Synthetic Collateralized Debt Obligations
From 2001-2007, the amount of debt due to MBSs increased
almost ten-fold, growing from approximately $160 billion to nearly
$1.5 trillion.100 Additionally, by 2007, CDOs outstanding reached
almost $2 trillion, $1 trillion of which was exposed to subprime
mortgages.o'0 Although MBS, CMO, and CDO exposure alone
eclipsed the monetary amount of subprime loans outstanding, in-
vestment banks innovated yet another instrument that enabled
even more investors to become involved in mortgage market invest-
ing. 02 This instrument is called the synthetic CDO. 0 3
The synthetic CDO is created through the use of derivative
contracts, mainly the credit-default swap.10 4 A credit-default swap is
a contractual instrument created for use by investors to hedge
against risk associated with investing in a particular asset or com-
modity.105 The simplest type of credit-default swap involves a hedg-
99. See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 1029 (asserting that AAA ratings of many
CDOs and Squared CDOs were artificial in light of quality, or lack thereof, of un-
derlying debt).
100. See id. at 1027 (illustrating extreme increase in debt leveraging sub-prime
mortgages that eventually went unpaid).
101. See id. (noting large amount of systemic risk pervasive in banking system
through use of structured products).
102. See id. at 1030-31 (noting investment banks' creation of innovative finan-
cial products to maximize transaction fees).
103. See id. at 1031 (considering creation of synthetic CDOs and systemic risk
created though their use).
104. See Moran, supra note 5, at 43-44 (outlining synthetic CDO construc-
tion). A derivative is a financial instrument that was created for use by industry
professionals to hedge against business risk. See id. at 41 (explaining derivative
securities). The value of these instruments, as their name suggests, is derived from
underlying assets such as stocks, bonds, commodities, mortgages, or other securi-
ties. See id. (noting that value of derivative is based on underlying assets). As the
value of the underlying assets rise or fall, the value of the derivative will increase or
decrease accordingly. See id. (showing causal relationships of value between under-
lying assets and derivatives). "They operate by allowing investors to place bets on
the direction they believe financial markets will move, without ever needing to own
tangible assets." Id. (emphasis added). A credit-default swap, a type of derivative
security, is a contractual instrument designed to insure hedging investors against
losses. See id. (detailing credit-default swap function). Credit-default swaps are
routinely used by investment banks to make markets between institutional inves-
tors and to facilitate bets on the value of assets such as MBSs or CDOs. See id.
(acknowledging credit-default swaps use within synthetic CDOs to facilitate bets
between large accredited investors).
105. See id. (recognizing hedging ability credit-defaults swaps afford). For in-
stance, if investor A had a long position in Apple stock of $1000, he may enter into
[Vol. 18: p. 569
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ing party paying another investor periodic payments in exchange
for the other investor's guarantee to cover the losses of the underly-
ing asset beyond an agreed upon point. 06 Therefore, credit-de-
fault swaps operate similarly to insurance.107 Periodic payments are
exchanged for protection against losses resulting from a "credit
event."108 These derivative instruments are commonly used to as-
semble synthetic CDOs to hedge against the downward risk of in-
vesting in MBSs, CMOs, CDOs, Squared CDOs, and other debt. 09
For instance, suppose investor A has ownership in a class of
debt and (1) wants to protect against losses associated with a poten-
tial credit event or (2) believes that the value of a certain class of
debt is going to decrease and wants to earn a profit on this decrease
in value.110 To accomplish these goals, investor A could assume a
"short-position" in a synthetic CDO.11  Meanwhile, Investor B be-
lieving that the debtors of the referenced debt are going to pay on
schedule, would assume the "long-position" in a synthetic CDO. 1 2
The investment bank would complete a number of transactions be-
tween each party and a special purpose vehicle to facilitate their
respective bets.113 Through these transactions, Investor A effec-
tively agrees to pay credit-default swap premiums to Investor B for
a credit default swap with investor B and pay investor B periodic payments in ex-
change for credit protection guaranteed by investor B such that investor B would
be liable to investor A if the value of Apple's stock decreased beyond an agreed
upon point. See id. (illustrating use of credit-default swap).
106. See id. (explaining contractual terms regularly used in credit-default
swaps and synthetic CDOs).
107. See id. (drawing similarities to insurance).
108. See id. (explaining why investors would purchase credit-default swap pro-
tection). A credit-event is an occurrence that adversely affects the underlying as-
sets referenced by the credit-default swap or synthetic CDO. See id. at 42
(commenting on credit-default swaps' ability to protect investors against credit
events that negatively affect underlying asset value). For instance, in the mortgage
market, credit events consist of borrowers defaulting on their loans, bankruptcy of
the borrower, restructuring of borrowers' debt, and credit rating changes of un-
derlying assets. See id. (analyzing effect of value of underlying debt in light of
credit events and protection provided by credit-default swaps).
109. See id at 43 (analyzing synthetic CDOs and use of CDSs to structure these
investment products).
110. See JANET M. TAVAKOLI, COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS & STRUC-
TURED FINANCE: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN CASH AND SYNTHETIC SECURITIZATION 117-70
(2003) (outlining common synthetic CDO transactions).
111. See id. (noting that investors who want to profit on decrease in value of
asset would take short position in that asset).
112. See id. (explaining that investors who want to profit on increase in value
of asset would take long position in that asset).
113. See id. (detailing common synthetic CDO construction).
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an agreed upon amount, period of time, and frequency.114 Addi-
tionally, in consideration for these payments, Investor B effectively
guarantees Investor A for losses incurred by the underlying
assets. 1 5
These transactions do not afford either investor ownership
rights in the underlying assets, but rather grant rights to payment
from an adverse party.11 6 Often, although occasionally used for le-
gitimate hedging purposes, investors utilize synthetic CDOs to spec-
ulate on the performance and value of the referenced debt.' 17 In
plain language, synthetic CDOs were often pure gambles.118
2. Secuitization's Role in Incentivizing Sub-Prime Lending
Investment banks' use of the OTD model created many incen-
tives to increase subprime lending, eventually leading to the mort-
gage market bubble and its subsequent collapse. 19 Investment
banks and commercial lenders did not have any incentive to stop,
or even slow, the securitization process because of the perceived
114. See id. (outlining rights and responsibilities of major parties of synthetic
CDO). In actuality, Investor A pays premiums to the investment bank and the
investment bank guarantees Investor A for any losses incurred by the underlying
losses. See id. (illustrating technical process of structuring synthetic CDOs). The
investment bank, however, takes an off-setting position with Investor B by paying
Investor B identical or similar premium payments, while securing a guarantee
from Investor B, thus making a market between Investor A and B; this explains
why, in effect, Investor A and B are exchanging considerations. See id. (explaining
actual constructs of synthetic CDO).
115. See id. (asserting effect of investment bank transactions).
116. See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 1031-33 (describing synthetic CDOs and
investors' interest in synthetic CDOs). Wilmarth describes the context of these in-
vestments by stating that:
managed pools consisting entirely of CDS... credit protection with reference
to the performance of nonprime RMBS or related indices. In practical
effect, the packaging of CDS enabled [investment banks] to create a new
class of investments that mimicked the performance of nonprime mort-
gages, even though the CDOs did not own either the mortgages them-
selves or nonprime RMBS.
Id.
117. See Moran, supra note 5, at 41 (noting speculative nature of synthetic
CDOs).
118. See id. ("They operate by allowing investors to place bets on the direction
they believe financial markets will move . . . ."). In addition, they were unregulated
because of the perception that the market for these instruments was very small and
"no systemic risk would exist since investors' inclinations to minimize their risks
would protect the broader financial system." Id. at 42. (illustrating Congress's rea-
soning for failing to regulate these investments).
119. See id. at 44-51 (commenting on securitization's role in incentivizing sub-
prime lending).
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lack of risk the banks faced and the fees each were accruing. 120 In-
vestment and commercial banks, driven by their interest in ob-
taining as many fees as possible, encouraged lending, influenced
sub-standard lending practices, and eventually caused an elevated
level of mortgage defaults, which lead to the housing market
collapse.12 1
Investment banks had an incentive to perpetuate the securitiza-
tion process because they transferred the default risks associated
with pools of loans to a broad base of institutional investors and
they enjoyed many transaction fees for structuring these securitized
products.'22 As long as demand existed for structured products,
the securitization process would not cease; and unfortunately for
the U.S. economy, the demand did not slow until after the mort-
gage market bubble was created and was on the brink of
collapse.12 3
Additionally, and perhaps more influentially, securitization
freed commercial banks of the traditional constructs of lending and
therefore incentivized increased credit extension and poor lending
practices.' 24 Commercial banks, rather than being responsible for
borrowers' failure to pay, sold pools of loans to investment banks
effectively transferring default risk off of their books.'25 The pro-
120. See id. at 44 (noting incentives to continue lending and structuring prod-
ucts because of fees collected and perceived risk-transfer).
121. See id. at 44-45 (describing originate-to-distribute model, incentives to
lend to sub-prime borrowers, financial products increasing exposure to sub-prime
loans). The originate-to-distribute model adopted by investment banks en-
couraged and enabled originating banks to extend a much greater amount of
credit and provided no incentive for originating banks to properly screen and
oversee loan applicants. See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 994-95 (detailing originate-
to-distribute model). Traditionally, originating banks managed loans from point
of extending credit until the repayment of debt; accordingly, originating banks
assumed the risk of borrowers defaulting on their loan payments, causing originat-
ing banks to properly screen and monitor borrowers. See id. (noting banks in-
creased liquidity and decreased risk through use of securitization). In addition,
banks traditionally provided loans by acting as intermediaries between depositors
and borrowers; in other words, banks used the money that was deposited by some
and lent the money out to others in order to gain interest payments. See id. (re-
counting benefits provided to commercial lenders by securitization). Thus, banks
could only lend a limited amount based upon the amount of deposits they re-
ceived; however, securitization and the originate-to-distribute model changed this
traditional structure. See id. (noting effect of securitization on normal lending
practices).
122. See id. (explaining investment banks interest in maintaining securitiza-
tion process).
123. See Moran, supra note 5, at 54 (showing creation of market bubble, col-
lapse and financial losses incurred by large investment banks which led to credit-
crisis).
124. See id. at 32 (describing lenders traditional roles and practices).
125. See id. (explaining risk-transfer characteristic of securitization).
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ceeds from the sale of these loans supplied commercial banks with
the necessary capital to continue to lend and freed them of their
traditional reliance on cash deposits to extend credit. 126 Commer-
cial banks, now free of their reliance on deposits, were afforded the
liquidity to lend at levels they were never able to achieve before. 127
Because of commercial banks' alleviation of default risk, the banks
did not properly screen prospective borrowers or monitor mortga-
gees' behavior once they were granted credit. 28 Because commer-
cial banks were willing and eager to lend "to nearly anyone capable
of signing on the dotted line," housing prices skyrocketed, default
rates inevitably increased, and the housing bubble eventually
collapsed.129
3. Securitization's Creation of Systemic Risk
Not only did securitization incentivize a perverse credit-boom,
but it also magnified the risks associated with the defaulting of
those mortgages.o30 Through securitization, investment banks
126. See id. (detailing liquidity infusion lenders received from investment
banks through securitization process).
127. See id. (noting commercial banks increased lending liquidity).
128. See Patricia McCoy et al., Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of
Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REv. 1327, 1339-44 (2009) (acknowl-
edging securitization's effect on lending standards). Lending standards deterio-
rated dramatically because:
mortgage lenders and brokers, believing that they were transferring all
risk to the [special-purpose vehicles] to which they sold mortgages, began
lending to less qualified mortgagors and on property with inflated or oth-
erwise questionable resale value. This accelerated the expansion of the
housing bubble and decreased the quality of loans being packaged into
mortgage-backed securities.
Id.
129. ANDREW Ross SORKIN, Too BIG Too FAIL 5 (2010). See McCoy, supra
note 128 at 1339-44 (asserting that because prices of housing were artificially in-
flated, only matter of time before housing prices adjusted to reflect actual value).
130. See id. at 1027-28 (explaining systemic risk created by investment banks).
Mr. Wilmarth explains:
Financial conglomerates used structured-finance techniques to create sev-
eral categories of investment instruments whose risks and returns were
derived from nonprime mortgages. As a practical matter, these struc-
tured-finance instruments created an inverted pyramid of risk, because
the combined face values of the structured-finance instruments (repre-
senting the inverted "base" of the pyramid) were much larger than the
"apex" of nonprime mortgages whose performance dictated the value of
the instruments. Put another way, [large investment banks] used struc-
tured-finance instruments to pile multiple layers of financial bets on top
of nonprime mortgages. In addition, while [investment banks] spread
the risks of those bets among a large universe of investors, [investment
banks] also retained significant risks in two ways. First, [investment
banks] "warehoused" nonprime mortgages, [mortgage-backed securities]
and [collateralized debt obligations] until they could be sold to investors.
[Vol. 18: p. 569
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packaged pools of loans into MBSs and CMOs, re-packaged MBSs
and CMOs into CDOs, re-packaged CDOs into squared-CDOs, and
facilitated high stakes bets on the value of these securities by creat-
ing synthetic CDOs referencing these packaged and repackaged
debt securities.13' Eventually, the combined face value of these
structured products nearly doubled the face-value of the loans out-
standing.132 Thus, when the value of these securities' values began
tumbling, huge losses were incurred by a large amount of
investors.' 3 3
The main problem, however, and the primary source of sys-
temic or economy-wide risk was the amount of risk the investment
banks maintained on their balance sheets.134 When default rates
skyrocketed and the mortgage market collapsed, investment banks
were crushed with losses.1'6 By November 9, 2005 global financial
institutions lost over $1 trillion and incurred estimated losses of
Second, [investment banks] transferred [mortgage-backed securities]
and [collateralized debt obligations] to off-balance-sheet structured in-
vestment vehicles (SIVs) that relied on explicit or implicit support from
the [investment banks]. When the subprime crisis broke out, [invest-
ment banks] incurred large losses from their exposures to "warehoused"
instruments and SIVs.
Id.
131. See id. at 1028-39 (describing pooling, packaging, and repacking process
investment banks pursued to maximize transaction fees).
132. See id. at 1031-32 (announcing U.S. economy's extreme level of expo-
sure to sub-prime mortgages).
133. See Moran, supra note 5, at 54-62 (outlining backlash against investors
and banks with respect to sub-prime market exposure).
134. See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 1032-35 (noting investment bank exposure
to sub-prime mortgages). As stated earlier, many investment banks warehoused
these structured products until the details of the transaction were worked out and
held subprime loans on their books until the banks could find investors to invest in
the securitized loans. See id. (citing banks' warehoused mortgages and risks associ-
ated with mortgages). Second, many of the products investment banks structured
were classified as partially-funded, and required the purchase of other assets to
complete these transactions. See id. at 1033 (describing "reputation risk"). Invest-
ment banks often purchased these assets to facilitate the transactions. See id.
(describing losses incurred as a result of reputation risk). The problem was that
the assets required to fund these products were not perpetually available, thus in-
vestment banks took out lines of credit to ensure that these structured products
maintained the funding needed. See id. at 1034-35 (discussing effects of risk main-
tained on balance sheets). Last, some investment banks intentionally retained se-
nior tranches of these structured products because of their perceived appeal as
low-risk rights to mortgage payments. See id. (arguing that risk-transfer perception
was illusory).
135. See id. (striking causal relationship between losses of investment banks
and credit-freeze).
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more than $4 trillion by the end of 2010.136 These losses have
caused investment banks to lend only sparingly, leaving much of
the economy without the ability to access much needed credit.137
The reliance on the investment banking system for liquidity com-
bined with the risks investment bank's assumed through securitiza-
tion created systemic or economy-wide risk and is a primary reason
why Wall Street losses affected Main Street prosperity so heavily.' 38
The financial crisis has exposed glaring weaknesses in the se-
curities laws and the regulation of structured products. 39 Remedy-
ing these weaknesses is necessary to avoid the catastrophic
consequences that the abuse of structured products can, and in-
deed did, cause.140 Reform must center on the primary flaws of the
existing legal framework, mainly the broad exemptions provided
for privately-placed securities and the flawed assumptions underly-
ing the securities laws generally.'41 As analyzed in Part IV and V,
gambling regulation, if applicable, can be an effective framework to
136. See U.S., European Writedowns, Credit Losses, REUTERS (Nov. 5, 2009, 11:44
AM) http://www.reuters.com/article/idCNL554155620091105?rpc=44 (detailing
prospective losses associated with financial crisis).
137. See Christopher E. Ware & Laura Gramling Perez, Main Street Meets Wall
Street: the Mortgage Meltdown, 80 Wis. LAWYER (2007), available at http://www.wisbar.
org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=WisconsinLawyer&template=/CM/ContentDis-
play.cfm&contentid=68942#bio (stating that "[t]he woes facing the subprime
mortgage market seem to affect every corner of our economy . . . .").
138. See id. ("Of course, Wall Street affected Main Street. Lenders with no
Wall Street cash available, offered fewer loans and fewer opportunities to refinance
high-rate loans and [adjustable-rate mortgages]. The housing boom became a
housing bust.").
139. See Morrissey, supra note 8 at 647-50 (asserting that flaws of federal secur-
ities laws "jeopardize the soundness of our entire capital markets"). Securitization
and the abuse of structured investments such as MBSs, CMOs, CDOs, Squared
CDOs and synthetic CDOs played an integral role in causing the mortgage market
collapse and the resulting financial crisis. See id. (describing structured products
role in financial crisis).
140. See Quinn, supra note 8, at 567-69 (considering securitization's role in
financial crisis); Morrissey, supra note 8, at 649 (providing main flaws of federal
securities laws). Morrissey stated that:
By adopting disclosure as the underlying philosophy of the federal securi-
ties laws, the framers of that legislation put too much faith in the pru-
dence of investors and the self-policing mechanisms of the capital
markets.... The weaknesses in such a half-measured approach were com-
pounded when even that flawed system of financial regulation was under-
mined by an expansion of the exemptions to its central requirement, i.e.,
that securities first be registered before they are sold.
Id.
141. See id. (illustrating problem in securities laws and suggesting possible
solutions).
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remedy the primary flaws in the securities laws.14 2 First, however,
whether gambling regulation is an appropriate legal framework to
apply to the regulation of structured products must be deter-
mined. 43 To ascertain the applicability of gambling law as a frame-
work to reform securitization regulation, a comparison of the
regulated activities and the issues that arise within each activity
must be undertaken.""'
III. THE APPLICABILITY OF A GAMBLING LAw FRAMEWORK
A. Comparing Investing and Gambling
Although often regarded as separate and distinct activities, in-
vesting and gambling are more similar than different. 45 Theodore
Roosevelt once stated that "[t] here is no moral difference between
gambling at cards or in lotteries or on the race track and gambling
in the stock market."146 Gambling and investing are similar in
three main ways. 147 First, the activities of gambling and investing
are inherently similar, especially when considering the amount of
skill needed to effectively participate in these activities.148 Second,
142. For an analysis of the potential effectiveness of gambling law to mitigate
negative effects created by securitization, see infra 238-408 notes and accompany-
ing text.
143. For a discussion of the applicability of a gambling law framework to
structured product regulation, see infra notes 151-237 and accompanying text.
144. For a comparison of gambling and investing, including the inherent,
definitional and behavioral similarities, see infra notes 151-237 and accompanying
text.
145. See generally Hurt, supra note 20, at 987-88 (describing many similarities
between gambling and investing); see also Erik Gerding, Playing Bridge vs. Playing
Poker: Goldman, ACA, and Paulson, CONGLOMERATE (April 19, 2010), http://
www.theconglomerate.org/gambling/ (comparing ABACUS synthetic CDO with
gambling).
146. 42 Cong. Rec. 1346-50 (1908). SeeJOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL
THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 159 (1936) (observing that "casinos
should, in the public interest, be inaccessible and expensive. And perhaps the
same is true for Stock Exchanges"); see also Irwin Friend, the Economic Consequences
of the Stock Market, 62 AM. EcoN. REv. 212, 212-13 (1972) (recognizing that invest-
ing is similar to gambling by describing stock market as "legalized gambling
casino").
147. See generally Hazen I, supra note 10, at 399-03 (noting main ways gam-
bling and investing are similar); see generally Pickens, supra note 20, at 239-45 (ex-
plaining that dichotomy drawn between gambling and investing is unfounded and
futile). Mr. Pickens notes that the distinction made between gambling and invest-
ing is an absurd elevation of formalism over more functional and logical reason-
ing. See id. at 239 ("Such a formalistic policy, despite receiving valid criticism, has
preserved for more than a century."). See infra notes 151-237 and accompanying
text.
148. For a discussion of the inherent and fundamental similarities between
the activities of investing and gambling, see infra notes 151-162 and accompanying
text.
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when participating in these activities, gamblers and investors ex-
hibit similar behavioral irrationalities.14 9 Third, gamblers and in-
vestors participate in their respective activities for many of the same
reasons.150
B. Inherent Similarities between Gambling and Investing
Gambling, by common law definition, is an activity where "a
person pays consideration in order to participate in an activity,
that's outcome is determined partly by chance, and may reward the
participant with something of value."15 1 Some investing activities,
such as purchasing stock on the stock market, entering into futures
contracts on the commodities market, purchasing corporate bonds,
or assuming a position in a synthetic CDO are surely encompassed
by the definition of gambling, especially the latter.1 5 2 These activi-
ties, like gambling, involve assuming a risk in hopes of an accession
to wealth. 153 Thus, gambling and investing are, at the very least,
similar by definition. 54
149. For a discussion of behavioral irrationalities gamblers and investors ex-
hibit, see infra notes 203-233 and accompanying text.
150. For a discussion of the motivations gamblers and investors demonstrate
when choosing to invest and gamble, see infra notes 163-193 and accompanying
text.
151. I. NELSON ROSE, GAMBLING AND THE LAW 75 (1986) ("Gambling under
common law, is any activity in which: a person pays something of value, called
consideration; the outcome is determined at least in part by chance; and, the win-
nings are something of value.") [hereinafter GAMBLING AND THE LAw].
152. See Hazen I, supra note 10, at 401-18 (comparing derivatives, securities,
gambling, and inherent similarity between activities). A synthetic CDO is a prod-
uct structured by investment banks that enable institutional investors to "place
bets" on the value of underlying assets. See 2 MOORAD CHOUDHRY, FIXED-INCOME
SECURITIES AND DERIVATIVES HANDBOOK ANALYSIS AND VALUATION 360-62 (2005)
(noting that synthetic CDOs are meant to be used for hedging or risk transfer
purposes but are often used by speculators to place bets on value of pool of under-
lying assets). In a synthetic CDO transaction, one party believes the value of the
assets will increase, while the other party believes the values of the assets are going
to decrease. See id. (explaining that party expecting value of underlying assets ref-
erenced in synthetic CDO are going to rise, or at least maintain their value, insures
other party for loss of value in assets). For a further discussion on synthetic CDOs,
see supra notes 100-118 and accompanying text.
153. See 4 ROBERT HAMILTON & RICHARD BOOTH, BUSINESS BASICS FOR LAW
STUDENTS: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 178 (2006) (explaining that in-
vesting in corporation in hopes of accession to wealth involves elements of risk and
chance); see Hazen I, supra note 10, at 410 (discussing risk-reward element of in-
vesting by stating "if an individual desires the high pay-off with sufficient intensity,
then he or she will be acting rationally in tolerating risk that many other rational
actors will not").
154. Compare GAMBLING AND THE LAW, supra note 151, at 75 ("Gambling under
common law, is any activity in which: a person pays something of value, called
consideration; the outcome is determined at least in part by chance; and, the win-
nings are something of value.") with Hazen I, supra note 10, at 410 ("[Ihf an indi-
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Gambling and investing are also similar because of the skills
necessary to sway the odds of obtaining a favorable outcome 155 A
common misconception is that investing is different from gambling
because investing requires analytical ability and gambling involves
pure chance.' 56 There are two problems with that notion.' 57 First,
many if not most investors pursue investment decisions for irra-
tional and ill-informed reasons without the use of analysis or re-
search.158 Second, many gambling activities involve the same kind
vidual desires the high pay-off with sufficient intensity, then he or she will be acting
rationally in tolerating risk that many other rational actors will not."). To empha-
size the inherent similarities between gambling and investing an example can be
illustrative. See Hazen II, supra note 20, at 1017-19 (illustrating similarities between
gambling "difference contract" and derivative investments). For example, if Mr.
Goldman believes that the value of a certain class of assets will rise in the near
future, and Ms. Sachs believes that the value of those assets are likely to decline,
the two may choose to wager on the difference of the value of the assets over time;
thus, if the value of the assets increase, Mr. Goldman would make money, and if
the value decreased Ms. Sachs would make money. See id. (demonstrating con-
struction of difference contract). This transaction is known as a "difference con-
tract" and is illegal. See id. (noting that difference contracts are illegal under
gambling laws). Mr. Goldman and Ms. Sachs, however, could enter into the same
arrangement utilizing a synthetic CDO. See id. (explaining that identical transac-
tions can be completed legally in different contexts). An investment bank would
create a special purpose entity or bankruptcy trust and execute a series of credit
default swaps between the parties in order to complete the desired outcome; essen-
tially, Mr. Goldman would pay Ms. Sachs periodic payments while the value of the
assets remain the same or increase, and Ms. Sachs would guarantee Mr. Goldman
the losses of the asset classes if a credit event caused their value to decrease. See id.
(using derivative contract to illustrate ability to wager utilizing investments). Thus,
although a synthetic CDO transaction achieves the identical effect as an illegal
difference contract, synthetic CDOs are legal, while difference contracts are for-
bidden. See id. (recognizing similarities between gambling and investing).
155. See Hurt, supra note 20, at 387 (explaining analytical abilities needed to
increase chances of choosing lucrative investment and comparing them with ana-
lytical abilities needed for gamblers to make informed bets on certain metrics).
156. See ROBERT P. MILES, WARREN BuFFrr WEALTH: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTI-
CAL METHODS USED BY THE WORLD'S GREATEST INVESTOR 167 (2004) (arguing that
investing is not similar to gambling because investing requires "skill, knowledge,
patience, and hard work"). Wise investing requires these characteristics; however,
gambling successfully requires these characteristics as well. See Hurt, supra note 20,
at 381-90 (explaining that participating in blackjack, poker or sports-betting re-
quires skill and analytical abilities in order to be successful over period of time).
157. See generally Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclo-
sure Antitdote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR
L. REV. 139, 139-204 (2006) (describing irrationalities investors regularly demon-
strate and arguing that securities regulation should be reformed to address those
irrationalities); Hurt, supra note 20, at 381-90 (noting level of skill needed to be
successful when participating in gambling activities such as poker, blackjack or
sports betting).
158. See Ripken, supra note 157, at 139-204 (discussing investor irration-
alities).
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of analytical ability, research, and skill that informed investing
requires. 159
For example, making an informed decision to purchase 100
shares of Apple Inc. involves researching Apple's financial state-
ments, analyzing the effect new competitors may have on Apple's
earnings, evaluating new product innovations, and even investigat-
ing the stability of management. 16 0 Likewise, prudently choosing to
assume the position that the Minnesota Vikings are going to win
more than nine games in the 2011 season involves analyzing the
team's roster, noting any player acquisitions or departures that may
affect the team's chances of winning, evaluating the difficulty of
their schedule, determining their ability to match up against their
opponents' style of play, and analyzing the risks that vital players
may be injured, diminishing the Vikings' chances of finishing
with more than nine victories.161 Therefore, although investing is
often perceived as a wise person's game, and gambling a degener-
ate's vice, gambling and investing require similar skills and
preparation.162
159. See Hurt, supra note 19, at 38-90 (demonstrating ability needed to gam-
ble successfully).
160. See id., at 387 (noting skills needed to succeed in certain gambling and
investing activities). Professor Hurt states:
Choosing . . . stocks and knowing when to sell does take skill, and the
most skillful should realize more profits than the unskillful. However, the
stock price is subject to elements outside of the investor's control: the
decision management, trends in the industry, and the overall market
economy. The stock price may change based on either factors specific to
that company, that industry, or the market as a whole.
Id.
161. See id. (noting skills needed to succeed in certain gambling and investing
activities). Professor Hurt states:
Similarly, gamblers that bet on individual sports games, like football, bas-
ketball, or baseball may make informed bets based on information availa-
ble on the teams and players involved. Like the wide availability of
information on publicly-held corporations, the access to information on
sports teams and players is remarkable. Notwithstanding, the strength of
the players in a sports game, the final outcome of the game is easily im-
pacted by elements beyond the gambler's control, such as injuries, lucky
plays, and the mood of the crowd.
Id.
162. See Macchiarola, supra note 20, at 42-43 ("In contrast to unsavory gam-
bling behavior, those activities fortunate enough to be labeled as investing have
traditionally enjoyed great acclaim, with cheerleaders highlighting investing as an
enterprise of skill in which the assiduous and diligent may earn deserved re-
wards."). But see Hurt, supra note 20, at 387 (demonstrating skill needed to suc-
ceed in certain gambling activities and rebutting investment/gambling
dichotomy).
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C. Motivations for Participation
1. Overview
In addition to definitional and inherent similarities, there are
also similarities with respect to what motivates individuals to gamble
and invest.163 When describing individuals' motivations to gamble,
leading gambling sociologists point to individuals': (1) need for
play, (2) desire to achieve social prestige, (3) internal competive-
ness, and (4) craving for gambling's entertainment value.164 Inves-
tors often possess many of the same motivations when they choose
to invest.165
2. Need for Play
Many sociologists contend that the need for play is a basic
human drive like the need for food and water. 16 6 Theorist Johan
Huizinga states that "play [is] an important evolutionary biological
adaptation" and "play activities serve both to relieve tension and to
inspire states of euphoria that are otherwise unattainable."167
These sociologists posit that gambling provides many individuals
with the amusement, enjoyment, challenge, and action that those
individuals need to satisfy their psychological drive to play.168 In-
vesting activities, such as day-trading, stock trading, and purchasing
derivative contracts are similarly used by individuals to satisfy their
163. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, MARKET VOLATILITY 59 (1989) (noting that
"[i]nvesting in speculative assets clearly shares with gambling the element of
play"). For a discussion on the need for play as a motivation to gamble and invest,
see infra notes 164-171 and accompanying text.
164. See 2 MiA AASVED, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GAMBLING 86-100 (Charles C.
Thomas ed., The Gambling Theory and Research Series) (2003) (discussing rea-
sons why people gamble).
165. See Ripken, supra note 157, at 159-76 (2006) (discussing behavioral and
cognitive biases exhibited by investors); Pouncy, supra note 10, at 283-13 (critiqu-
ing assumption of economic rationality in securities regulation); Donald C.
Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 857-72 (1992) (discussing decision-making of investors);
Hazen I, supra note 10, at 399-12 (noting securities regulation's assumption of ra-
tional investor); Hazen II, supra note 20, at 996-05 (demonstrating investor
irrationalities).
166. See AASVED, supra note 164, at 87 (explaining suggestion that "the need
for play, like the need for food and sex, is an ancient instinctive drive that can be
satisfied through gambling").
167. Id. Huizinga also noted that he "saw evidence of the purported 'play in-
stinct' in all legal, philosophical, socioeconomic, technological, and artistic accom-
plishments of civilized societies. . . ." Id. at 88.
168. See id. (noting gambling's ability to satisfy need for play and theorized
that "our reliance on gambling to satisfy or reduce this need is learned in child-
hood through such games as marbles, card playing, and other games in which no
actual money is staked").
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need to play.'69 Indeed, many professors and securities law experts
posit that "people invest not simply to make money but also for
investing's consumption or 'play' value . . . ."170 Individuals are
often drawn to investing and gambling to satisfy their need to play
because of the excitement, risk, and rewards investing and gam-
bling both provide.1 7 '
3. Desire for Social Prestige
Many individuals also gamble to satisfy their drive for social sta-
tus or prestige.1 72 Behavioral scientists have suggested that humans
possess a learned or acquired need to achieve social status or pres-
tige.' 7 3 According to noted behavioral scientists James Smith and
Vicki Abt, "various cultural signals actually condition would-be gam-
blers" and "the reflecting and teaching functions of culture may
169. See SHILLER, supra note 163, at 56-62 (1989) (mentioning that investors
often invest for play value).
170. Langevoort, supra note 165, at 867-68. The need for play is often used to
justify investor's decision to participate in day-trading, in light of the irrationality
of day-trading as an activity. See DON DEVrrTro, IRRATIONAL MARKETS AND THE ILLU-
SION OF PROSPERTrrY 143-50 (2001) (explaining that day-trading is irrational activity
and that irrationalities drive investors to participate in this activity); see also SHII
LER, sup-a note 163, at 57-61 (indicating that play value may explain why day-trad-
ing is so popular among investors). Day-trading when considering transaction
costs and its adversarial process is a negative-sum activity; therefore when partici-
pating in day-trading over an extended period of time, an individual is more likely
than not to actually lose money. See GARY W. ELDRED, VALUE INVESTING IN REAL
ESTATE 36 (2002) (demonstrating why day-trading is negative-sum game). Eldred
compares day-trading to gambling by stating that:
Gambling is a negative-sum game. In the aggregate, gamblers lose. The
house odds are stacked against them. . . . But playing the market, engag-
ing in day-trading, and commodities trading, and buying futures con-
tracts also represent forms of gambling. Absolutely no evidence supports
the widely held belief that one can make money in trading in and out of
positions on a short-term basis. Quite the opposite is true. Researchers
have studied this topic exhaustively, and the results remain unambiguous:
traders lose.
Id. Many individuals, nonetheless, continue to participate in day-trading. See id.
(finding odds of making money are not in favor day-traders). This irrational per-
sistence on participating in a negative-sum activity is often explained by individu-
als' drive to satisfy their need for play, including their desire for amusement,
enjoyment, challenge and action. See SHILLER, supra note 163, at 57-61 (indicating
that play value is one explanation of why day-trading is so popular among inves-
tors); see JAKE BERNSTEIN, THE COMPLEAT GUIDE To DAY TRADING STOCKS 20-21
(2000) (describing "tremendous growth of day trading since the mid 1990s" and
hypothesizing reasons for such growth).
171. See SHILLER, supra note 163, at 57-61 (explaining characteristics of invest-
ing that make investing so appealing).
172. See AASVED, supra note 164, at 92-93 (describing gambling and its ability
to satisfy need for social status or prestige).
173. See id. (explaining that individuals acquire need for social status or pres-
tige throughout life and often attempt to satisfy that need through gambling).
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actually predispose Americans to gambling behavior."17 4 Smith and
Abt argue that in a society where wealth is the principal indicator of
a person's self-worth, participating in adversarial and challenging
activities that promise the award of wealth are a means of attempt-
ing to satisfy that need.175 They also posit that "owing to the strong
cultural pressures to compete and win, those who are not physically
endowed or athletically inclined will seek other ways of [satisfying
their need for social status or prestige]."176 The thrill of competi-
tion and the possibility of an accession to wealth that gambling af-
fords can draws individuals to gamble.177
Investing, like gambling, involves an element of competition
and affords the potential for accession to wealth.178 Accordingly,
investing activities provide a means for individuals to satisfy their
acquired need to achieve social status or prestige. 79 Indeed, indus-
try professionals, who are perceived as the most rational investors of
the markets, do not always invest in rational and self-maximizing
ways and often make decisions based upon their "considerations of
status." 80
4. Internal Competitiveness
Innate and internal competitiveness is also a major reason why
individuals choose to participate in investing and gambling activi-
174. Id.
175. See id. (demonstrating that gambling is often used as means to experi-
ence an accession to wealth in order to satisfy need for social status or prestige).
176. Id. at 93.
177. See id. (explaining that competition afforded by gambling, and its pur-
pose of obtaining wealth in order to gain social status or prestige is what attracts
many to gamble).
178. See id. (describing characteristics of gambling and investing).
179. See BROOKE HARRINGTON, Pop FINANCE 5 (2008) (stating want of status
can influence individuals to invest and cause investors to invest irrationally). In
the early 1990s, a large increase of stock-trading occurred among the wealthy, mid-
dle, and even the lower class. See id. at 11 (explaining growth of stock markets).
Millions of individuals began investing and poured hundreds of billions of dollars
into the stock market. See id. (noting extent of stock market growth). Congress
described the influx of investors as "an explosion of stock ownership." Jim Saxton,
Roots of Broadened Stock Ownership, Joint Economic Committee: 106th Cong. (April
2000), available at, http://www.house.gov/jec/tax/stock/stock.pdf. This explo-
sion can be partly explained by individuals' need to obtain social status and pres-
tige. See HARRINGTON, supra note 180, at 5 (explaining that individuals as well as
professional investors are influenced by want of status when making decisions to
invest and how to invest).
180. Id.
35
Chuff: Rolling the Dice on Financial Regulatory Reform: Gambling Law as
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2011
604 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENr. LAW JOURNAL
ties. 8 1 Charles Lamb once noted that "man is a gaming animal.
He must be always trying to get the better in something or
other."18 2 A person's competitiveness and internal drive to excel
motivates many individuals to gamble.183 Media often portray gam-
blers as "daring, larger-than-life heroes thriving on risk."18 4 Many
individuals, because of their competitive personalities, are com-
pelled to develop superior skills in gambling activities to assume
these roles portrayed by the media.185
Moreover, the challenge posed by many gambling formats and
the element of competition inherent in gambling, motivates many
individuals to pursue this activity, notwithstanding media influ-
ence. 1 8 6 For instance, David Hayano, an anthropologist with a pas-
sion for gambling, stated that "[w]inning brings on a feeling of
power and the sensation that the run of the cards and the attack of
opponents are well under control." 87 Many seek this feeling when
they choose to gamble.188
Individuals' competitive nature and confidence in their ability
to "beat the market" also motivate many to invest.18 9 For instance,
181. See AASVED, supra note 164, at 100 (explaining competitive nature of
many individuals and their propensity to choose certain activities because of that
competitiveness).
182. CHARLEs LAMB, ELIA: ESSAYS WHICH HAvE APPEARED UNDER THAT SIGNA-
TURE IN THE LONDON MAGAZINE 83 (1823).
183. See AASVED, supra note 164, at 100 (positing that many gamblers "are mo-
tivated by their enjoyment of the game, and especially by the challenge of competi-
tions and the opportunity to exercise their own skill and intelligence in playing a
winning game").
184. Id. at 92.
185. See id. at 100-01 (noting that individual's internal competitiveness cou-
pled with portrayals of successful gamblers cause many people to pursue gambling
as avenue of competition).
186. See id. (explaining that adversarial framework of many gambling activities
attracts many individuals to pursue gambling as avenue of competition notwith-
standing media influence and perceptions of successful gamblers).
187. Id.
188. See id. (explaining that internal competitiveness causes individuals to ex-
perience thrill of victory and agony of defeat).
189. See Ripken, supra note 157, at 163-67 (noting that many individuals' com-
petitiveness causes them to believe that their abilities are greater than their peers
and that they are able to beat market averages in order to gain greater profit).
"Beating the market" refers to a person's ability to value a security more accurately
than the remainder of market participants. See HAMILTON, supra note 153, at 432-
34 (explaining investors' goals to exceed average market rate of returns). The effi-
cient market hypothesis posits that the price of a security reflects all publicly availa-
ble information. See id. (noting that when information material to security's value
is made public, investors trade pursuant to that information rapidly incorporating
information into price of security). Thus, when information is made public, inves-
tors will buy or sell stock according to their perception of the information and the
price will adjust to reflect this information. See id. (explaining that many irrational-
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many investors overestimate their own knowledge and valuation
skills.o90 Many individuals feel that they are smarter than other
market participants, have a more intuitive sense of the value of cer-
tain companies, and can trade according to their estimates of value
and achieve an accession of wealth and victory.191 Individuals' in-
nate competitiveness often causes them to believe that their own
skills and strategies can lead to favorable outcomes, notwithstand-
ing the large element of chance that is inherent in the activity.' 92
This competitiveness and over-confidence leads many individuals to
pursue day trading, stock trading, and positions in derivative
contracts.193
5. Investing and Gambling as Forms of Entertainment
A significant reason people decide to gamble and invest is the
entertainment value. 194 Many individuals participate in these activi-
ities may cause investors to overreact to certain information causing security's
price to inaccurately reflect disclosed information). Beating the market would en-
tail analyzing the information, its effect on a security, determining whether the
price of the security is too high or too low, and trading accordingly. See id. (dem-
onstrating that if efficient market hypothesis is correct, and investors rationally
respond to all publicly available information, then "the goal of money managers
and institutional investors to beat the averages in the long run is impossible").
190. See Ripken supra note 157, at 166 (explaining that investor's internal
competitiveness can cause them to be "overconfident in their abilities to assess
risks and to make wise investment decisions").
191. See id. ("Most investors overrate their stock-picking abilities and believe
that their investment skills are above average.").
192. See id. (acknowledging that more people participate in gambling because
their competitiveness leads them to "believe that positive investment outcomes are
due to investor's own skills and superior strategy, rather than good luck").
193. See id. (explaining that more people participate in gambling because
their competitiveness leads them to overestimate their skills). Individual's internal
competitiveness and resulting overconfidence serves double functions as a motiva-
tion to invest as well as a behavioral irrationality of investing that results in noise
trading and inefficient markets. See id. at 166-67 (demonstrating that individuals'
competitiveness can influence investors to pursue investing as well as cause inves-
tors to exhibit irrational tendencies when investing).
194. See Hurt, supra note 20, at 9-11 (noting that participants in activities such
as day-trading participate for entertainment purposes); see also Hazen I, supra note
10, at 401-02 ("Many investors participate in the securities or derivatives markets as
a form of entertainment."). Professor Hazen notes that "market participants often
view investing as a hobby or participate for the thrill of the game." See id. (explain-
ing investors' motivations when choosing to invest). See Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi,
Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 MICH. L. REv. 313, 314 (2002) ("Investing in the
United States has become a hobby for many."); Carl Richards, Investing Is Not En-
tertainment (Feb. 8, 2010, 11:42 AM), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/
08/investing-is-not-entertainment/ (cautioning investors who are investing for en-
tertainment purposes). Mr. Richards discussed the influx of entertainment inves-
tors by stating:
Somewhere along the line, investing became America's favorite spectator
sport. Everywhere you went people were talking about finding the next
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ties for the "thrill of the game" and "to feel alive."I 95 Most SoCiolo-
gists conclude that "the appeal of most common forms of gambling
can be explained by their entertainment value." 9 6 Moreover, com-
mentators have speculated that "[i]f we were to create a list of
words that describe gaming, we would surely include excitement,
hot stock, mutual fund or alternative investment. Magazine covers like
"10 Hot Funds You Have to Own Now" and "Five Stocks that Sizzle" made
investing sound fun, and you couldn't go anywhere without seeing Jim
Cramer screaming "Buy! Buy! Buy!"
Id. See also Michael Johnston, Have Fun Investing, SEEKING ALPHA (Oct. 27, 2009),
http://www.gurufocus.com/news.php?id=91327 (emphasizing enjoyment gained
from investing in Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs)); Kimberly Palmer, Gen Y: Invest-
ing Is Fun Not Scary, US NEw & WORLD REP. LP (Oct. 13, 2009) http://money.us
news.com/money/blogs/alpha-consumer/2009/10/13/gen-y-investing-is-fun-not-
scary ("It turns out [investors] consider investing an enjoyable activity.... In fact,
one in three of those surveyed said they invest because it's fun, an increase from
about one in four last year.") There is even an "Investing For Fun" group on the
social networking site, Facebook. See Investing For Fun, FACEBOOK, http://www.
facebook.com/group.php?gid=22476024380 (last visited Mar. 9, 2011) (group
dedicated to discussion of investment issues); Stacy Rapacon, 5 Steps to Start Invest-
ing: Find the fun in investing, and take control of your money, KIPLINCER (April 14,
2010), http://www.kiplinger.com/columns/starting/archive/5-steps-to-start-in-
vesting.html (discussing fun in investing); AASVED, supra note 164, at 89 (explain-
ing that gamblers gamble for the entertainment value afforded). But see Eugene
Christiansen and Julie BrinkerhoffJacobs, The Relationship of Gaming to Entertain-
ment, GAMBLING: PUBLIC POLICIES AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 11-48 (William R. Ead-
ington & Judy A. Cornelius eds., 2007) (arguing that association of gambling and
entertainment is attenuated).
195. See Hazen I, supra note 10, at 401-02 (arguing that many people invest to
feel excitement). SeeAASVED, supra note 164, at 89 (holding that gambling is attrac-
tive to many because of its entertainment value).
196. David Spanier, The Joy of Gambling, LEGALIZED GAMBLING: CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES COMPANION 32 (David L. Bender et al. eds., 1999). Although, this is an
extreme stance, Mr. Spanier maintains that gambling is not about the money and
that the "playful, active risk-taking is the true appeal of gambling." See id. at 34-35
(comparing money to gasoline by stating that "[m]oney is the fuel of gambling ...
as gasoline powers a car. But the pleasure of driving a car is not about the gas. It's
about speed, style, movement. . . . In that sense, the real motives behind gambling
are to be sought elsewhere"). Spanier holds that money is simply the object that is
required for participation, and that many people gamble and spend so much
money gambling for the entertainment value gambling affords. See id. (explaining
that the appeal of gambling is action and entertainment involved). Spanier main-
tains that the entire gambling experience, from risking-taking, the inherent chal-
lenge, the excitement, and the mental separation from everyday life is the true
reason that people gamble. See id. at 36-37 (disputing argument that people gam-
ble to achieve accession of wealth). Spanier explains that the entertainment value
afforded by gambling can be as attractive and addictive as sexual activity. See id. at
36 (noting similarity between gambling and sexual excitement). Spanier states
that "[i]t's part physical, part psychological, highs and lows, over and over, in rapid
succession." Id. "These fluctuations of loss and gain, the glint of light and action,
awareness of other people gambling, the sense underneath it all of playing with
risk, of living on the edge of danger, are exciting" and why people gamble. Id.
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anticipation, entertainment, and chance." 197 These characteristics
explain why gambling has become the largest grossing entertain-
ment attraction in the United States, far exceeding the movie in-
dustry in earnings. 198
Thomas Lee Hazen has posited that "investing in individual se-
curities or derivative products provides a form of entertainment for
some investors in much the same way as rational actors are willing
to gamble, notwithstanding the odds and the cut to the house, be-
cause of the enjoyment of the game."199 Investing, although not
often perceived as a form of entertainment, possesses many of the
same characteristics as gambling, and, individuals often invest be-
cause of this entertainment value.200 Indeed, like gambling, inher-
ent in investing is risk-taking, challenge, and the excitement of
winning.20 Thus, these characteristics attract many individuals to
pursue investing as well as gambling. 202
197. M. Neil Browne, et al., The Role ofEthics in Regulatory Discourse: Can Market
Failure justify Regulatory Casino Gaming?, 78 NEB. L. REv. 37, 39 (1999).
198. See WILLIAM S THOMPSON, LEGALIZED GAMBLING 41 (1994) (recognizing
gambling as leading form of entertainment).
199. Hazen I, supra note 10, at 150.
200. See Hurt, supra note 20, at 9-11 (noting that some people engage in activ-
ities such as day-trading for entertainment purposes); Hazen I, supra note 10, at
401-02 ("Many investors participate in the securities or derivatives markets as a
form of entertainment."). Professor Hazen notes that "market participants often
view investing as a hobby or participate for the thrill of the game." Id. See also
Ayres, supra note 194, at 314 ("Investing in the United States has become a hobby
for many.").
201. See HARRNGTON, supra note 180, at 13-16 (explaining characteristics of
investing and why so many people begin investing).
202. See id. (noting appeal of investing to average individuals). Investing is
often perceived as an activity that sophisticated professionals participate, using
complicated models and analyzing complex information in order to maintain mul-
tifaceted, diversified portfolios that will appreciate in value over time. See
Langevoort, supra note 165, at 851-72 (explaining persistent misconception that
most investor's act rationally and conduct in depth analysis, when in fact few inves-
tors actually conduct such analysis). Admittedly, many market participants are that
type, but they are the minority. See id. (noting that most investors are not sophisti-
cated risk analysts and invest in variety of ways and for variety of reasons). The
majority of investors, on the other hand, invest for a variety of other reasons, in-
cluding entertainment value. See HARINGTON, supra note 180, at 13-17 (explain-
ing characteristics of investing and why so many people begin investing).
Throughout the 1990's and into the twenty-first century, deregulation and techno-
logical innovations such as online investing afforded a greater number of people
the opportunity to begin participating in investing. See id. (explaining develop-
ments that changed census of investors). The entertainment value of investing
attracted many individuals to begin trading in the market. See id. (explaining that
investing is form of leisure for investors). Indeed, market participants have de-
scribed investing as "exciting, confusing, tumultuous and the only game worth
playing." Id. at 5. Moreover, one executive of an investment group assembled in
the 1990s stated that she invested at a high rate throughout the 1990s because of
she was "caught up in the euphoria of the [expanding] market." Id. at 14. Invest-
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D. Behavioral Irrationalities Exhibited by
Gamblers and Investors
1. Overview
Investing and gambling are similar in a number of ways, in-
cluding definitional and inherent similarities. 203 Additionally, in-
vestors and gamblers pursue and continue to participate in their
respective activities due to many of the same motivations. 20 4 Most
importantly, however, individuals that participate in each of these
activities demonstrate similar behavioral and cognitive irrationali-
ties. 205 Common behavioral and cognitive irrationalities that inves-
tors and gamblers exhibit are outlined above. 206
2. Overconfidence Bias
Psychological literature has shown that individuals exhibit a
striking degree of overconfidence. 2 0 7 A majority of people believe
that they possess above-average skill in most activities. 208 Overconfi-
ing has the physical and psychological effect that Mr. Spanier explained causes
people to gamble. See Pickens, supra note 20, at 42-43 (explaining that investing
activities have same kind of psychological and physical effects on individuals as
gambling has on individuals). The highs and lows, the ebbs and flows, the risk and
the excitement are all inherent characteristics of investing and make it an ex-
tremely attractive activity for many individuals. See id. (demonstrating that invest-
ing and gambling can pose "impulse control" problems that may lead to addiction
to those activities). See also AASVED, supra note 164, at 86-100 ("Various cultural
signals actually condition would-be gamblers. The media participate by romanti-
cizing stories about gambling and gamblers frequently showing darling, larger-
than-life heroes thriving on risk, and also by giving enormous publicity to game
show contestants or gamblers who wins substantial prizes.").
203. For a discussion of the inherent similarities between gambling and in-
vesting, see supra notes 151-162 and accompanying text.
204. For an explanation of what motivates individuals to invest and gamble,
see supra notes 163-202 and accompanying text.
205. See generally, Ripken supra note 157, at 139-90 (explaining behavioral
and cognitive irrationalities that investors demonstrate and suggesting reform of
securities laws to address biases).
206. See infra notes 207-237 and accompanying text.
207. See Ripken, supra note 157, at 163-68 (explaining overconfidence bias).
208. See id. at 163-67 (noting that many individuals are confident that their
abilities are greater than their peers). Most people feel that they are above average
drivers, more intelligent and ethical than the average individual, and are more
likely to produce gifted children, have a higher than average salary, and greater
than average happiness in their careers. See Ola Svensen, Are We All Less Risky and
More Skillful than Out Fellow Drivers?, 47 AcrA PSYCHOLOCICA 143, 145-48 (1981),
available at http://heatherlench.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/svenson.pdf
(noting individuals overconfidence in their own driving abilities); Robert A. Pren-
tice, The SEC and MDP: Implications of the Self-Serving Bias for Independent Auditing, 61
OHIO ST. L.J. 1597, 1613 (2000) (explaining individuals belief that they are
smarter than average humans); Marsha T. Gabriel et al., Narcissistic Illusions in Self-
Evaluations of Intelligence and Attractiveness, 62 J. PERSONALITY 143, 145-52 (1994),
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dence can cause individuals to undertake certain ventures, without
adequately considering the accompanying risks and believing that
their superior skills will lead to a favorable outcome.209 Individuals
"making predictive judgments under uncertainty . .. are prone to
exhibit far too much confidence in highly fallible choices."210
Overconfidence bias affects investors and gamblers alike. 211
Gamblers often believe that their superior ability to analyze the
risks and odds of certain gambling activities will lead them to a
favorable outcome. 212 Additionally, when results do not meet their
expectations and losses occur, gamblers attribute the unfavorable
outcome to being unlucky or unfortunate.2 13 Similarly, investors
are often overconfident in their abilities to analyze the merits of an
investment opportunity and believe that their "above-average" abili-
ties will lead to favorable returns. 214 "Although they recognize that
risks of bad outcomes exist, investors are reluctant to believe that
these risks apply to them personally."2 15 Furthermore, even when
investors incur bad losses, they tend to rationalize these losses by
available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1994.tbOO7
98.x/abstract (showing that humans irrationally believe they are more intelligent
than they actually are); Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathan D. Brown, Illusion and Well-
Being: A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health, 103 PSYCHOL. BULL, 193, 195-
98 (1988), available at http://faculty.washington.edu/jdb/articles/Illusion%20and
%20Well-Being.pdf (demonstrating confidence of newlyweds concerning pros-
pects of their marriage). Newlyweds almost unanimously expect that their mar-
riage will last until death despite their awareness of the extremely high divorce
rate. See Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average:
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAw & Hum. BEHAV.
439, 443 (1993), available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/rt5p27088122n430/
fulltext.pdf (explaining confidence related to marriage longevity).
209. See Ripken, supra note 157, at 163-67 (explaining overconfidence bias
individuals demonstrate).
210. Id. at 165.
211. See Ripken, supra note 157, at 163-67 (explaining overconfidence exhib-
ited by investors).
212. SeeAAsVED, supra note 164, at 105 (explaining "attribution theory of gam-
blers where gamblers attribute losses to luck and winning to superior skill").
213. See id. at 105-11 (noting gamblers' persistence in attributing losses to bad
luck rather than lack of skill). For example, in horse racing many gamblers often
try to rationalize losses in a way that maintains their perception of their superior
abilities. See id. at 111 (demonstrating gamblers' loss attribution biases). "There's
always a logical explanation for a losing bet - the saddle slipped, the filly was in
heat, the race was fixed etc." Id.
214. See Ripken, supra note 157, at 166 ("The illusion of control causes inves-
tors to believe that positive investment outcomes are due to investors' own skills
and superior strategy than risk.").
215. Id. at 171.
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attributing them to factors beyond their control, and thereby main-
taining confidence regarding future investment opportunities.2 1 6
3. Confirmation Bias
Another cognitive bias that both gamblers and investors tend
to exhibit is confirmation bias. 217 Confirmation bias is illustrated
by individuals' tendencies to (1) seek out information that confirms
their beliefs about uncertainties and (2) discard information con-
trary to their beliefs regarding a prospective outcome. 218 Once in-
dividuals reach a predictive conclusion about a particular outcome,
typically "they filter information for evidence that supports their de-
cisions or actions" and "tend to avoid, minimize, or reject new in-
formation that contradicts their previously established beliefs."219
Investors' decision-making processes are often clouded by con-
firmation bias.220 Confirmation bias leads many investors to inter-
pret corporate disclosures in light of their previously optimistic
views about an investment opportunity and to discount information
contrary to those optimistic beliefs. 221 "Investors have a systematic
tendency to hold onto bad investments longer than they should,
perhaps with the optimistic belief that the investment is bound to
pay off."222 Gamblers demonstrate this same irrationality. 223 Gam-
blers are generally acutely aware that the odds of a particular gam-
bling activity are unfavorable or that a large proportion of
216. See id. (describing gamblers' tendency to remain optimistic despite
losses). Aasved proceeds to explain the psychological cycle many investors go
through with respect to their optimism of future bets by stating:
Most gamblers who encounter [bad losses] . . . initially start betting in an
entirely uncontrolled manner. . . . They then enter a 'realization' phase
during which they begin to acknowledge the irrationality and futility of
this betting behavior, to regain some of their self-control, and to employ
sound betting strategies. . . . Gamblers ... resume betting in their nor-
mally controlled manner. This is known as "putting it all behind you.
Id.
217. See Ripken, supra note 157, at 172 (noting individuals' tendency to ex-
hibit confirmation bias).
218. See id. at 172-76 (explaining confirmation bias).
219. Id. at 173.
220. See id. at 175-76 (demonstrating effect of confirmation bias on investors).
221. See id. (describing investors' tendency to emphasize certain information
and discount other information due to optimism about investments and refusal to
acknowledge risks associated with certain investments).
222. Id. at 176.
223. See AASVED, supra note 164, at 105-11 (explaining gamblers tendency in
order to attach greater significance to information confirming their optimism to
justify decision to gamble).
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participants have lost money participating in that activity. 224 Gam-
blers, nonetheless, have a tendency to discount such information
and highlight other information, such as the successful venture of
another player who the gambler perceives to have above-average
skill and more experience with that gambling activity.2 25
4. Herd Behavior
Many sociologists and securities experts have also noted indi-
viduals' tendency to invest or bet with the crowd or herd.2 26 Herd
behavior involves individuals mimicking others' actions often under
the assumption that these actors may have information that the in-
dividual was not afforded.227 This behavior is recognized as an indi-
vidual's tendency to "run with the herd."228 This behavior has been
noted to be caused by an individual's fear of acting contrary to a
majority of participants as well as the ability to share the blame with
the herd if the outcome is less than desirable.229 Investors and
gamblers exhibit this irrationality frequently. 230 Investors who no-
tice a large increase in trading volume of a particular security often
decide to trade that stock as well in hopes that the other investors
are trading in the observed manner because of their access to infor-
mation that the investor is not afforded.2 3' Gamblers also often ex-
hibit this type of behavior, many times for inexplicable reasons.232
224. See id. (noting that most gamblers know that odds of game are against
them).
225. Id.
226. See Hazen II, supra note 20, at 997-1000 (demonstrating that many inves-
tors trade according to how other traders are trading).
227. See id. (explaining herd behavior); see also David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy
C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AM EcoN. REv. 465, 477 (1990), available
at https://umdrive.memphis.edu/cjiang/www/teaching/fir8-7710/paper/herd%
20behavior%20and%20investment.pdf (suggesting that many traders focus on ac-
tions of other traders when making investment decisions).
228. See Hazen II, supra note 20, at 997-00 (explaining herding tendency).
"Run with herd" refers to individuals' choice to proceed based on the actions of
others. See id. (explaining individuals to side with majority of others in certain
contexts).
229. See id. (identifying underlying causes of herd behavior).
230. See Scharfstein, supra note 227, at 477-80 (discussing investors tendency
to invest in stocks that are being traded heavily); H. SHANE DARRIsAw, COMMON
SENSE AIN'T COMMON: A GUIDE FOR POSITIONING YOURSELF To TAKE FULL ADVAN-
TAGE OF YOUR CREDIT AND FINANCIAL OPPORTUNITIES 69 (2008) (explaining that
herding behavior is exhibited in gambling and investing).
231. See Hazen II, supra note 20, at 997-1000 (describing effect of herding
behavior by noting that "relatively miniscule price changes that might be attributa-
ble to rational factors can become 'highly leveraged' as signals of how other inves-
tors are likely to act").
232. See DARRISAw, supra note 230 at 69-70 (explaining that gamblers often
place bets and raise according to how others playing the game bet).
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For instance, while playing roulette participants are often influ-
enced by the wagers of a majority of gamblers when deciding
whether to place a bet on red or black.23 3
E. Applicability: Regulating in Light of Participant Behavior
Gambling law serves as a useful tool to reform securities regula-
tion and the regulation of structured products. "The choice of the
best regulatory structure for the markets is influenced by the ways
in which we look at the market structure and the behavior of market
participants."234 Given the behavioral and cognitive similarities ex-
hibited by gamblers and investors, gambling law, if effective, can
serve as an applicable framework to regulate structured products.235
To determine the effectiveness of a gambling law framework, an
overview of securities and gambling regulation, including an analy-
sis of each regime's effectiveness in mitigating the negative exter-
nalities associated with the regulated activities is necessary.2 6 Part
IV undertakes this overview and Part V provides suggestions for re-
form of structured products regulation using gambling law as a
framework. 237
233. See id. (demonstrating gambler herd behavior).
234. Hazen I, supra note 10, at 396-97 (emphasis added).
235. See Margaret V. Sachs, Materiality and Social Change: The Case for Replacing
"The Reasonable Investor" with "The Least Sophisticated Investor" In Inefficient Markets, 81
TUL. L. REv. 473, 473 (2006) (discussing current reasonable investor standard and
arguing that standard should be altered within context of inefficient markets). As
will be discussed, gambling regulation is premised upon these behavioral and cog-
nitive irrationalities and regulates accordingly. See William N. Thompson et al.,
Remedying the Lose-Lose Game of Compulsive Gambling: Voluntary Exclusions, Mandatory
Exclusions, or an Alternative Method, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1221, 1221 (2007) (ex-
plaining gambling laws ability to address cognitive irrationalities of gamblers). On
the other hand, securities regulation bases its rules upon the "reasonable investor"
and assumes that investors act rationally. See Sachs, supra note 235, at 473 (explain-
ing reasonable investor standard). Often, assuming the plaintiff is a reasonable
investor can lead to suboptimal results. See id. at 47-85 (noting unfair conse-
quences of reasonable investor standard in certain contexts). Thus, securities reg-
ulation like gambling regulation should consider these irrationalities when
deciding how to regulate. See id. (arguing for reform of securities laws in certain
contexts).
236. For a brief overview of the securities laws, gambling regulation and each
regime's effectiveness in addressing the negative externalities created by the regu-
lated activities, see infra notes 238-329 and accompanying text.
237. For a proposal of how to reform the securities laws in order to reduce
systemic risk in the economy and address investor irrationalities, see infra notes
330-408 and accompanying text.
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IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF A GAMBLING LAW FRAMEWORK
A. Contrasting Securities Regulation with Gambling Law
Despite the similarities between investing and gambling, invest-
ing is afforded a much more lenient regulatory structure.238 In-
deed, structured products, the financial instruments that strongly
influenced the financial crisis, were effectively exempt from regula-
tion.239 Gambling regulation, on the other hand, is pervasively reg-
ulated and provides for minimal exemptions.240 Analyzing each
regime's effectiveness in mitigating negative externalities while
maintaining the intended benefits of the regulated activity can be
instructive in determining the ways structured product regulation
can be reformed.241
B. Gambling Law
1. Regulatory Regime
Gambling law, unlike securities regulation, is regulated prima-
rily by the States.242 State gambling regulations tend to focus on
238. For a discussion of gambling and securities regulatory regimes, see infra
notes 242-328 and accompanying text.
239. See McCoy, supra note 128, at 1379 (explaining exemption that incen-
tivized sub-prime lending).
240. For an overview of gambling law and its abilities to reduce the negative
externalities associated with gambling, see infra notes 242-267 and accompanying
text.
241. See Hazen I, supra note 10, at 401-18 (comparing derivates, securities,
gambling and inherent similarities between activities, noting that their disparate
regulatory regimes are unwarranted).
242. See Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914)
(stating that "the power of the state to establish all regulations that are reasonably
necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of
the community. . . . can neither be abdicated nor bargained away, and is inaliena-
ble even by express grant"). The Federal government has only intervened in gam-
bling regulation in limited circumstances to address matters such as interstate
gambling, criminal activities, and Indian gaming. See EDwARD A. MORSE & ERNEST
P. Goss, GOVERNING FORTUNE: CASINO GAMBLING IN AMERICA 94 (2007) (explaining
federal government's limited role in governing gambling). Federal statutes that
address interstate or cross-bordering gambling include the Wire Act, the Interstate
Transportation of Paraphernalia Act, the Travel Act and the Amateur Sports Pro-
tection Act. See Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2010) (providing in part that
"[w] hoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a
wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce
of bets or wagers .. . shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both."); Interstate Transportation of Paraphernalia Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1953 (2010).
[w]hoever . . . knowingly carries or sends in interstate or foreign com-
merce any . . . device . . . designed for use in (a) bookmaking; or (b)
wagering pools with respect to a sporting event; or (c) in a numbers,
policy bolita, or similar game shall be fined . . . or imprisoned for not
more than five years or both.
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consumers' concerns and protect against fraudulent, unfair, or oth-
erwise dangerous practices that potentially affect the community, its
citizens, and the economy.2 4 3 States' discretion to grant licenses to
and oversee the operations of casino owners and employees is a
central feature of state regulatory regimes. 244 These powers serve as
the state's primary means of control over the gaming industry
within their state. 245
a. Licensing
State gaming commissions are granted discretion by the state
to require, issue, deny, suspend, or revoke gambling licenses. 246
The commissions also have the power to adopt gaming regulations
and initiate disciplinary proceedings. 247 For example, Nevada's li-
censing practices involve restricting licenses to individuals (1) with-
out a criminal record, (2) who demonstrate "good character,
Id. See also Travel Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1952 (2010) (providing in part that "whoever
travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the mail or any facility in inter-
state or foreign commerce with the intent to (1) distribute the proceeds of any
unlawful activity; or... (2) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facili-
tate . . .any unlawful activity"); see Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 3702 (2010) (forbidding sports gambling in all states besides states that legalized
sports gambling before passage of this Act).
243. See MORSE, supra note 242, at 100 (noting states' goals of regulating gam-
bling activities). For instance, Nevada regulatory regime seeks to protect the gen-
eral welfare of the state and its inhabitants. See id. (outlining Nevada's gambling
regulatory scheme). Nevada's Gaming Control Act states in part that:
All establishments where gaming is conducted and where gaming devices
are operated . . . must therefore be licensed, controlled and assisted to
protect the health, safety, morals, good order and general welfare of the
inhabitants of the state . . . to preserve the competitive economy and
policies of free competition of the State of Nevada.
Id. See also Nevada Gaming Control Act, Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 463.0129(d) (set-
ting forth goals of Nevada gambling regulation). State regulations also ensure that
state governments collect taxes imposed against casinos, maintain the economic
viability of the gaming enterprise within the state, and protect those vulnerable to
compulsive gambling behaviors. See MORSE, supra note 242, at 99 (noting other
purposes of state gambling regulation).
244. See MORSE, supra note 242, at 102 (explaining Nevada's use of licensing
as their main means of control over gaming industry). For example, Nevada Gam-
ing Control Act states that it is unlawful for an "owner, lessee, or employee" to
carry on any gaming activity without possession of a license. See Nevada Gaming
Control Act, Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 463.0152 (noting requirement of license to
carry on gambling venture).
245. See MORSE, supra note 242, at 102 (detailing states' power to control
gambling).
246. See id. (describing Nevada's use of licensing as their main impetus of
control over gaming industry); I. Nelson Rose, The Legalization and Control of Gam-
bling, 8 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 245, 267-300 (1979-1980) [hereinafter Rose] (outlining
main measures to control gambling).
247. See GAMBUNG AND THE LAw, sup-a note 151, at 181 (demonstrating states
control over gambling industry to state ordained commissions or agencies).
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honesty, and integrity," (3) who have adequate business sophistica-
tion within the industry, and (4) who have proposed financing that
is "adequate for the nature of the proposed operation; and from a
suitable source" in order to be licensed as a gambling enterprise.248
b. Operational Control
Nevada's gaming agencies also have authority to continuously
oversee a licensee's operations.249 This continuous supervision pro-
vides close scrutiny of gambling enterprises' operations and ensures
that the enterprises are acting with good faith to mitigate the nega-
tive externalities affecting the state's inhabitants and economy.2 5 0
The agencies have broad authority to inspect gaming premises,
gambling equipment, and demand access to the institution's
records and documents. 251 This broad authority is effective in miti-
gating the possible negative externalities associated with gambling
enterprises.252
248. Rose, supra note 246, at 271. See also MORSE, supra note 242, at 102-03
(describing Nevada's use of licensing to control most aspects of gaming industry).
249. See Rose, supra note 246, at 271 (demonstrating great deal of control
state agencies and commissions have over gambling licensees).
250. See id. at 271-72 (showing that purpose of pervasive control afforded to
state agencies is reduction of negative externalities associated with gambling, such
as problem gambling, and possible illegal activity that would stunt growth of
economy).
251. See id. at 271-73 (stating that Nevada Gaming Commission requires gam-
bling enterprises to make periodic financial reports to the commission and must
allow independent auditors to inspect their financial documents); Nevada Gaming
Control Act, Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 463.158-463.159 (mandating commission's re-
sponsibilities and duties to conduct financial oversight). Section 463.157 states
that:
The commission shall by regulation require periodic financial reports
from each non-restricted licensee and: (1) Specify standard forms for re-
porting financial condition, results of operations and other relevant fi-
nancial information. (2) Formulate a uniform code of accounts and
accounting classifications to assure consistency, comparability and effec-
tive disclosure of financial information. (3) Prescribe the interval to
which such information shall be furnished....
Id. § 463.158. In addition section 463.159 mandates that "[t]he commission shall
by regulation require audits of financial statements of all non-restricted licensees
with an annual gross revenue of $1,000,000 or more ... not less frequently than
once a year." Id. § 463.1589. The Nevada Gaming Commission also mandates that
transfer of ownership of the gaming operation is strictly prohibited and unquali-
fied individuals are forbidden to be involved in any aspect of a gambling institu-
tion. See id. § 463.300 ("It is unlawful for any person to sell, purchase, lease,
hypothecate, borrow, or loan money, or create voting trust agreement or any other
agreement of any sort to or with any licensee in connection with any gaming oper-
ation, except in accordance with the regulations of the commission.").
252. See Rose, supra note 246, at 254 (explaining deterrence of organized
crime, which would affect surrounding community and economy).
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c. Other Regulatory Devices
Other states have more stringent gaming regulations than Ne-
vada. New Jersey operates under a system of licensing and auditing
that is very similar to Nevada's licensing system, but has additional
layers of control. New Jersey constrains licenses to particular areas
of the state and requires gambling institutions to include certain
amenities connected to their gambling premises, such as an ap-
proved hotel of at least 500 sleeping units. 2 5 3 New Jersey restricts
gambling to specific areas of the state in order to better control
corruption, organized crime, and other negative externalities of
gambling. 254
Additional regulatory devices that other states employ include
(1) restricting the hours of operations of gambling enterprises, (2)
limiting who may participate, (3) disallowing gambling on margin,
(4) prohibiting gambling institutions from offering certain ameni-
ties, and (5) broadly taxing gambling revenues, and controlling an
institution's right to advertise.2 55 These regulatory devices provide
state gaming agencies the authority to closely monitor and strictly
regulate all aspects of gambling. 25 6 In sum, states have broad au-
thority to decide who can operate gambling enterprises, how those
253. See id. at 284 (explaining regulations New Jersey has promulgated in ad-
dition to strict license standards).
254. See id. at 286 (recognizing that limiting gambling activity to certain areas
of state "make it easier to control corruption and organized crime because there
would be fewer applicants to investigate, fewer operating casinos to police," " sub-
ject the [fewer number of applicants] to closer scrutiny and force operators to
screen their ties more carefully").
255. See Gabaldon, supra note 20, at 278-84 (outlining other methods gam-
bling commissions use to constrain externalities of gaming industry). Most state
restricts the time and place gambling can occur in order to ensure that gambling is
not made easily available. See id. at 278-79 (outlining access to gambling limita-
tions). These restrictions guard against impulse gambling and force gamblers to
cease their gambling operations at some point. See id. (stating purpose of access
restrictions). States also restrict gambling to adults and have discretion to force
gamblers to cease playing if deemed necessary by the agency. See id. at 279 (noting
restriction of individuals allowed to participate). Restricting a casino's ability to
extend credit to patrons is also a measure taken by state commissions in order to
prevent gamblers from becoming increasingly leveraged, aggravating the local
economy due to individuals defaulting on their loans from the casinos. See also
MORSE, supra note 242, at 110 (outlining restrictions on gamblers' ability to gamble
on margin and becoming increasingly leveraged in their gambling activities);
Gabaldon, supra note 20, at 279-80 (noting purposes of credit restrictions to pro-
tect consumers and to protect economy).
256. See Hurt, supra note 20, at 987-88 (demonstrating strictness of gambling
regulation by stating that "many gambling activities and investing activities can be
described as equally as speculation... . Notwithstanding this reality, investing is an
activity that the law supports and encourages, but gambling is an activity that the
law at least nominally discourages and at most prohibits"); Hazen I, supra note 10,
at 375-80 (recognizing disparate regulatory treatment of investing and gambling).
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entities can operate, who they can employ to aid in the enterprises'
operations, who can participate in the enterprises activities, what
amenities the enterprise can offer, to what extent the institution
can advertise, and to inspect these enterprise in order to ensure
compliance with all the aforementioned standards and preserve the
integrity and health of the surrounding community and
economy.257
2. Ability to Address Gambler Irrationalities
Gambling regulation, unlike the federal securities laws, ad-
dresses the irrationalities that gamblers exhibit and the possibilities
for those irrationalities to pose costs to the community and econ-
omy. 25 8 Gambling regulation is concerned not only with the licens-
ing, control, and operations of actual gambling facilities, but also
contemplates socially sensitive issues, such as compulsive gam-
bling.2 59 For instance, gambling regulation addresses the irrational
behaviors exhibited by intoxicated patrons by holding establish-
ments responsible for gamblers' losses if the establishment allows
patrons to continue gambling while visibly intoxicated. 26 0 In addi-
tion, gambling institutions often monitor the behavior and wager-
ing practices of known compulsive gamblers to ensure their well-
being as well as the welfare others.261
257. See generally Rose, supra note 246, at 267-300 (noting elements of control
states utilize to prohibit negative externalities of casinos). For a further discussion,
see supra notes 242-256 and accompanying text.
258. See Cory Aronovitz, The Regulation of Commercial Gaming, 5 CHAP. L. REv.
181, 200 (2002) ("Compulsive and underage gambling, alcohol consumption, and
the scope of authorized gaming are the most common sensitive issues that con-
front lawmakers and regulators. Typically, these issues are addressed in the gaming
legislation where, with varying degree, lawmakers provide a framework for regula-
tors to follow."); see also Browne, supra note 197, at 41-42 (acknowledging regula-
tory efforts to examine and regulate economic and societal impact of gambling).
259. See Aronovitz, supra note 258, at 199-202 (asserting gambling regulation
and its attention to social and economic externalities).
260. See GNOC Corp. v. Aboud, 715 F. Supp 644, 644 (D.N.J. 1989) (holding
that casino has duty to refrain from knowingly allowing intoxicated patron to gam-
ble); see alsoJessica L. Krentzman, Dram Shop Law - Gambling While Intoxicated: The
Winner Takes it All? The Third Circuit Examines a Casino's Liability for Allowing a Patron
to Gamble While Intoxicated, Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Associates, 41 VILL L. REv.
1255, 1268-70 (1996) (arguing that casino's should be held liable for losses of visi-
bly intoxicated patrons). See Aronovitz, supra note 258, at 202 ("Alcohol is a sensi-
tive issue for casinos because of local regulation, hours of consumption, and
complimentary drinks for casino patrons. Like compulsive gambling, alcohol con-
sumption invokes strong emotions.").
261. See Aronovitz, supra note 258, at 200 ("Missouri has been the leader in
regulatory programs that address problem gambling. The Commission . . . offers
free compulsive gambling counseling to both problem gamblers and their family
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Other measures that gambling regulation institutes in order to
guard against gambler irrationalities include the following: (1) re-
stricting the hours of operations of gambling facilities to allow gam-
blers cooling-off periods so that they can regroup; (2) regulating
the advertising of gambling as to not entice individuals, especially
impressionable individuals, to participate; (3) restricting the
amount of credit casinos can extend to patrons in order to decrease
the incentive to gamble beyond the individual's means; and (4) es-
tablishing programs designed to educate gamblers about the odds
of particular gambling activities and the dangers of compulsive
gambling, enabling them to make rational choices concerning
when and how to gamble. 262
3. Gambling Regulation's Focus on Systemic Risk
Legalized gambling activities are subject to strict scrutiny by
state gaming agencies.263 "Many people fear that gaming will pro-
duce substantial negative impacts on society, either because gaming
has a colorful past filled with unsavory individuals, or because it has
the potential to wreak social havoc, absent direct and continuous
oversight."264 All jurisdictions that have legalized gambling have
opted to create a governance structure to ensure that the costs asso-
ciated with gambling do not become invasive to the community or
economy.2 6 5 Indeed, state legislatures, when deciding to legalize
gambling recognize "the potential negative impacts of gaming, and
establish a comprehensive regulatory framework that strictly gov-
erns virtually every aspect of the business."2 66 As a result, the op-
portunity for systemic risk and pervasive externalities to affect the
surrounding community and economy are effectively mitigated,
members. The Commission also created a voluntary exclusion program, whereby
problem gamblers can isolate themselves from the temptations of gaming.").
262. See id. at 190-99 (outlining regulatory measures states adopt to ensure
stability of community and economy); see also Gabaldon, supra note 20, at 251-52
(detailing common state gambling regulations designed to eliminate negative ex-
ternalities associated with gambling activities).
263. See Rose, supra note 246, at 267-99 (summarizing gambling regulations
and noting stringency and effectiveness).
264. Aronovitz, supra note 258, at 181.
265. See Browne, supra note 197, at 42-43 (emphasizing externalities of gam-
bling and need for strong oversight). State legislatures recognize "that legalized
gambling creates moral decay and destroys the lives of gambler's along with the
families and loved ones" that it "attracts corruption and organized crime and en-
courages compulsive gambling and its accompanying social woes such as street
crime, domestic violence, and bankruptcy." Id. Additionally, many realize that if
unchecked gambling can "drain local economies rather than invest in them." Id.
266. Aronovitz, supra note 258, at 190.
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while the intended benefits such as economic revitalization and its
entertainment value are maintained. 267
C. Securities Regulation
1. Regulatory Regime
The regulation of securities is primarily governed by federal
law rather than state law. 26 8 The Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities
Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act,"
and collectively with the Securities Act, the "Securities Laws") are
the major federal statutes applicable to a broad range of corpora-
tions and investments.269 The Securities Act regulates the offering
267. See Rose, supra note 246, at 286-87 (discussing models of casino control
and their ability to control corruption).
268. See 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAw OF SECURITIEs REGULA-
TION 34-38 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter HAZEN TREATISE 1] (explaining that securi-
ties markets are predominantly governed by federal law). The first securities laws
were enacted by states and are known as blue sky laws; however, states have been
largely preempted by the federal government with respect to regulation of securi-
ties and commodities trading. See id. at 32-34 (explaining state law regulatory
structure that preceded federal laws). Most state securities laws required merit
review of each security that was offered in the state. See id. at 33 (noting stringency
of state securities laws). Merit review involved the state securities commissioner to
review the terms of each deal and grant or deny a license to sell the securities in a
state depending on whether the deal was fair, just and equitable. See id. (emphasiz-
ing states focus on reviewing the merits of investments rather than merely requir-
ing broad material disclosures). The federal securities laws rejected merit review
in favor of a disclosure based philosophy to securities regulation. See id. at 34-35
(acknowledging disclosure approach favored by Congress as opposed to state merit
regulation). Disclosure-based philosophy is based on the assumption that in-
formed investors are the best judges of the merits of an investment and that disclo-
sure of pertinent information by companies is the best way to inform investors. See
id. at 35-38 (explaining assumption of federal laws that investors are able to make
informed decisions based on broad disclosures).
269. See id. at 34-38 (introducing Securities Act of 1933 and Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934). Federal Securities laws only apply in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security. See generally id. at 82-162 (analyzing comprehensively
what type of investments are considered securities rather than commodities). The
more similar a particular financial instrument is to a share of stock the more likely
the instrument will be considered a security and within the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral securities laws. See id. at 83-84 (describing characteristic of securities). The
Supreme Court established four factors to determine whether a financial instru-
ment is a security: (1) the investment of money, (2) in a common enterprise, (3)
with the expectation of profits, (4) solely from the efforts of others. See Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 295-99 (1946) (enunciating fac-
tors that became known as "Howey Test"). Many cases have expanded on the
Howey test broadening the jurisdiction of the federal securities laws. See generally
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985) (holding that sale of major-
ity of shares of closely held corporation constituted sale of securities subject to fed-
eral jurisdiction despite fact that selling controlling interest in corporation does
not satisfy Howey test). See generally Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990)
(creating presumption that promissory note is security for purposes of federal se-
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of securities to the public, while the Exchange Act regulates the
trading of issued securities on national exchanges and markets. 270
a. The Securities Act of 1933
The Securities Act was enacted to prevent investors from being
defrauded in connection with the sale or purchase of securities in
interstate commerce.271 The Securities Act attempts to mitigate
fraudulent activity by requiring public companies to register a dis-
closure document with the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") before offering or selling securities to the public. 2 7 2 The
purpose of the registration statement is to disclose all material facts to
investors so that they can make an informed decision when invest-
ing.27 3 The reasoning underlying these requirements is that full
curities laws, but, noting that presumption may be rebutted by showing that trans-
action was not likely to be available for trading by public).
270. See HAZEN TREATISE 1, supra note 268, at 182-87 (explaining that Securi-
ties Act governs public offerings while, Exchange Act governs trading of securities
on secondary market). The SEC was created to enforce these federal laws and
have played an integral role maintaining the efficiency and integrity of the securi-
ties markets. See id. at 38-39 (explaining role of SEC in securities regulation). The
SEC has the responsibility of administering the federal securities laws and does so
through rule-making, adjudications, investigatory and enforcement powers. See id.
at 58 (emphasizing large role SEC plays in securities regulation). Additionally, an
organization called Financial Industry Regulatory Agency ("FINRA") governs the
conduct of national securities exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE") and the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"). See Mac-
chiarola, supra note 20, at 63-70 (explaining FINRA's role in regulating securities
markets). FINRA governs the exchanges conduct by establishing and enforcing
standards for members of the exchanges and any other listed companies. See id.
(outlining FINRA responsibilities).
271. See HAZEN TREATISE 1, supra note 268, at 34-36 (explaining reasons why
Congress enacted Securities Act).
272. See id. at 34-36 (describing disclosure requirements of Securities Act).
The SEC completes a detailed review of the registration statement and may request
clarification of certain aspects of the statement from the corporation. See HAMiL-
TON, supra note, 153 at 349-50 (detailing Securities Act and role of SEC in enforc-
ing that Act). Moreover, the SEC has the power to issue a stop order in
connection with any security offering in violation of securities laws. See id. (noting
SEC's ability to prohibit investments in violation of securities laws).
273. See id. (describing disclosure philosophy of federal securities laws). The
federal securities laws do not grant authority to federal agencies to inspect the
merits of particular investment opportunities. See id. (illuminating contrasting ap-
proach the state laws). Rather, the securities laws posit that full and fair disclosure
allows investors to make informed decisions about the merits of certain invest-
ments. See id. (explaining underlying assumptions of securities laws). Most initial
public offerings, must be registered by filing a SEC form called the S-1 which is the
most comprehensive form the SEC requires. See id. (outlining registration require-
ments of corporation making public offering). After the initial public offering, if a
corporation issues more stock, referred to as a secondary offering, the company
only has to complete a S-1 or S-2 which are less extensive disclosure forms. See id.
(explaining registration forms that are required when a corporation sells addi-
tional shares of stock).
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disclosure allows investors to evaluate the merits of investment op-
portunities obviating the need for government merit analysis of the
securities offered by corporations.274
If a public company offers or sells a security to the public with-
out prior registration with the SEC, the company will be subject to
severe civil liabilities and possible criminal prosecution.275 Moreo-
ver, under Section eleven of the Securities Act, if the registration
contains misrepresentations or omissions of material facts, the com-
pany, its board of directors, its officers, the underwriters, and any
experts that signed or consented to be included within the registra-
tion statement can be held liable for the misstatement or omission
of material fact.27 6
b. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The Exchange Act governs five main areas of securities regula-
tion: periodic filing; shareholder proxy regulation; tender offers;
insider trading; and other manipulative behavior in connection
274. See id. (showing assumptions of disclosure philosophy).
275. See id. (noting consequences of failing to register public offering).
276. See id. (outlining parties that may be held liable for sale of unregistered
securities). Entities involved in purchasing or selling securities must disclose all
material information that is required by disclosure guidelines or necessary to en-
sure that a disclosure is not misleading. See Glenn F. Miller, StaffAccounting Bulletin
No. 99: Another Ill-Advised Foray into the Murky World of Qualitative Materiality, 95 Nw.
U. L. REv. 361, 368 (2000) (explaining when material information must be dis-
closed). See, e.g., Wharf Ltd. V. United Int'l Holdings, 532 U.S. 588, 593 (2001)
(noting that material information need not be disclosed without duty to do so);
Yvonne Ching Ling Lee, The Elusive Concept of "Materiality" Under US. Federal Securi-
ties Laws, 40 WILIAMEE L. REv. 661, 661 (2004) (discussing materiality stan-
dard); Jennifer O'Hare, Retail Investor Remedies Under Rule 1Ob-5, 76 U. CIN. L. REV.
521, 536-37 (2008) (noting that materiality must be proven to recover under lOb-
5). A misstatement or failure to disclose information, where there was a duty to
disclose, is actionable if the misstated or withheld information is material. See Lee,
supra 276, at 661 (discussing materiality standard and its application difficulties).
Thus, the concept of materiality is used to determine what information must be
disclosed to investors. See id. (explaining policy objectives of securities laws).
Whether a fact is material "depends on the significance the reasonable investor
would place on the withheld or misrepresented information." See TSC Indus. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (emphasis added) (establishing material-
ity standard for proxy fraud). A misrepresentation or omission is material if there
is a "substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of in-
formation made available." Id. To be material, the misstated or omitted informa-
tion must affect the decisional process of the reasonable investor. SeeJames 0.
Hewitt, Developing Concepts of Materiality and Disclosure, 32 Bus. LAw. 887, 891 (1976-
1977) (discussing purposes of requiring disclosures of material information). In
other words, to be material, the information must be considered important or sig-
nificant by the reasonable investor when deciding whether to complete a certain
transaction. See O'Hare, supra note 276, at 536-37 (explaining materiality
standard).
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with the purchase or sale of securities. 277 While the Securities Act
monitors and regulates corporations issuing stock, the Exchange
Act regulates the issuers once the stock is being traded on the sec-
ondary markets.278
The Exchange Act dictates that public companies must register
and submit periodic reports with the SEC.279 These reports are not
the equivalent of a registration statement required when offering a
security to the public, but are rather disclosures required by the
SEC that are intended to update and inform the public of the con-
tinued health and viability of a corporation. 280 Accordingly, once
the corporation has issued stock, which is being traded on the sec-
ondary market, these periodic disclosures are required. 281
277. See 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAw OF SECURITIEs REGULA-
TION 456-59 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter HAZEN TREATISE 2] (setting forth require-
ments of Exchange Act). Once stock has been issued by a company and is being
traded on a National Exchange, the stock is subject to the requirement of the
Exchange Act. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 781(a) (1976)
(outlining registration requirements). Shareholder proxies enable shareholders
to elect a person or entity to represent their interests at shareholder meetings; in
order to solicit votes from other shareholder by use of proxy the Exchange Act
procedures and registration requirements must be followed. See Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C.A. 78n(a), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 (setting
forth rules governing proxy solicitation). Tender offers, generally speaking, in-
volve an offer to purchase securities of a single class of stock; these offers can be
used to attempt a corporate takeover and are governed by the Exchange Act. See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13(d),(e), 14(d), (e), (f), 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 78m(e),(f), 78n(d), (e), (f) (providing protections for corporations against cor-
porate takeovers). Insider trading is when a corporate insider has material infor-
mation concerning the value of the company's security and trades on that
information without properly disclosing that material information to the public.
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(a) (requiring dis-
closures concerning insider trading).
278. See HAZEN TREATISE 2, supra note 277, at 456-57 (stating that Exchange
Act applies to publicly held companies and "required continued registration and
periodic reporting").
279. See Exchange Act of 1934 § 12 (g), 15 U.S.C.A. § 781(a) (1976) (requiring
registrations of security if traded on national exchange). Over-the-counter securi-
ties are securities that are not traded on a national exchange but are rather trans-
actions between a limited amount of participants and must make periodic reports
if the issuing company has more than $10,000,000 in assets and have more than
500 shareholders on record investing in the company's equity. See Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 781(g), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (denoting require-
ments for non-exchange traded securities to complete periodic reports).
280. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(a) (out-
lining requirements of periodic reporting).
281. See id. (requiring periodic reporting in order to enable investors to make
informed decisions concerning their investments). Corporations are required to
file annual reports called a form 10-K, quarterly reports called 10-Q forms, and
under certain circumstances 8-K forms which are reports required when matters of
major significance affects the corporation. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.10-K, 10-Q, 8-K
(enforcing reporting of financial metrics as well as other material information). A
form 10-K is an annual report that includes information about the corporation,
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The Exchange Act also governs the use of shareholder proxies
and shareholder proposals.28 2 State laws require corporations to
hold annual shareholder meetings in order to vote for and elect the
board of directors of the corporation. 283 The majority of share-
holders, however, are usually absent from these meetings.284 As
such, interested parties such as other shareholders or current man-
agement may wish to solicit voting rights from those shareholders
who do not wish to attend through the use of proxy solicitations. 285
The Exchange Act mandates that an interested party must deliver a
proxy statement to a shareholder before soliciting them for their
voting rights.286 The proxy statement must detail the matters that
including a description of the business and the companies property, the manage-
ment's discussion and analysis of the financial condition of the company and the
results of operations, fully audited financial statements, description of any material
legal proceedings the company is involved, quantitatively and qualitatively material
disclosures about market risk, and information concerning the company's direc-
tors and officers. See HAMILTON, supra note 153, at 366 (explaining 10-K require-
ments). A form 10-Q is a quarterly report, containing unaudited financial data
and any other material information that concerns the performance of the com-
pany such as commencement of significant litigation. See id. at 366-67 (detailing
10-Q requirements). A form 8-K is a report that must be filed when specific mate-
rial events occur that may affect the company's performance, including when
there is a change in control of the company, an acquisition or disposition of criti-
cal assets, a filing for bankruptcy, a change in the company's auditor, resignation
of director or principal officer, election of a new director or principal officer,
change in fiscal year, material events regarding employee compensation, earnings
releases, amendment or waiver of the company's code of ethics, the addition or
cancellation of a material business contract, a change in the credit rating of the
company's security, or an amendment to the certificate of incorporation or the
corporation's bylaws. See id. at 367 (outlining 8-K requirements). In addition, any
time an issuer of securities voluntarily discloses information that is not required by
the Exchange Act, the issuer must do so in a way that ensures that the entire public
has access to the information as to ensure that all interested investors and analysts
are informed of the information; this rule is called Regulation FD and was promul-
gated by the SEC pursuant to the Exchange Act. See id. at 367-68 (discussing re-
quirements of voluntary disclosures).
282. See 3 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 456-59 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter HAZEN TREATISE 3] (explaining that securi-
ties markets are predominantly governed by federal law). Proxy regulations allow
shareholders to appoint agents to vote on behalf of the shareholder and also allow
shareholders to make proposals to the board of directors suggesting certain
changes to the corporate culture. See Securities Exchange Act § 14a-8, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8 (regulating shareholder proxies and proposals).
283. See, e.g., Del. Gen. Corp. L. tit. 8 §§ 2.11, 2.12 (2010) (requiring corpora-
tions to hold annual shareholder meetings in order to elect shareholder
directors).
284. See HAMILTON, supra note 153, at 370-72 (explaining shareholders' ability
to vote without attending shareholder meetings).
285. See id. (explaining shareholders' ability to vote through proxy
solicitation).
286. See id. (detailing prerequisite to soliciting shareholders for their voting
rights).
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are to be voted on at the shareholder meetings, include informa-
tion about the solicitors, and their reasons for soliciting the share-
holders' voting rights. 28 7 The purpose of these disclosures is to
ensure that the shareholders are making informed decisions about
granting their voting rights to another shareholder or agent.2 8 8
Shareholder proposals, on the other hand, are a means for cor-
porate shareholders to influence the direction and policy of the
corporation.28 9 The board of directors comprise the strategic man-
agement body of a corporation and retain discretion to make all
policy decisions concerning the company.290 Shareholders, how-
ever, can make use of proxy statements to include suggestions of
changes that they want the board of directors to implement.291 Al-
though shareholder proposals cannot force the board of directors
to adopt any changes to the corporate governance structure, a ma-
jority of shareholders may influence the board of directors' policy
decisions in light of the shareholders' ability to remove directors
and elect new board members.292
The Exchange Act also provides remedies to investors or share-
holders who have been misled or defrauded.293 For instance, an
287. See id. at 371-72. The proxy statement must include: the date, time, and
place of meeting; the deadline for submitting shareholder proposals; detailed in-
formation concerning the identity and background of individuals nominated for
director; matters that are being voted on; the process of that vote; the identity of
the party who is soliciting the shareholders voting rights; detailed information
about officer compensation; stock performance compared to major competitors
and peer companies; equity compensation plans such as dividend; and any transac-
tions that the corporation entered into with a director, officer, five-percent share-
holder of the corporation, or any family member of those individuals. See id. at 371
(setting forth formal requirements of proxy statements). Additionally, when the
party soliciting the shareholder voting rights are the management of the company
and relating to an annual meeting where directors are to be elected, the proxy
statements must be accompanied by an annual report to shareholders including
the financial statements of the company previous two fiscal periods, information
about the company's stock and dividend payments, industry segment information,
and information about the directors and officers of the company. See id. at 372
(outlining additional disclosures required when management is soliciting voting
rights from shareholders).
288. See id. at 372-74 (explaining purpose of shareholder proxies).
289. See id. at 374 (specifying purpose of shareholder proposals).
290. See id. (noting role of board of directors of corporation).
291. See id. (explaining shareholders use of shareholder proposals to influ-
ence board of directors as to management and business affairs of firm).
292. See id. (showing that shareholder proposals may influence board of direc-
tors to change management structure because of their desire to remain director of
corporation).
293. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78i (discussing
regulation fraud). Section Nine of the Exchange Act outlaws manipulative prac-
tices in connection with the purchase or sale of securities on public markets and
provides a implied private right of action for private investors. See id. (forbidding
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aggrieved investor or shareholder, or alternatively the SEC through
enforcement actions, may bring claims against corporations, bro-
ker-dealers, or investment banks if any of these entities defrauded
an investor or shareholder. 294 The most common claims brought
against these entities are proxy fraud, securities fraud, and insider
trading claims.295 Each of these remedies is designed to facilitate
full and fair disclosure enabling investors and shareholders to make
well-informed decisions regarding investment opportunities and
voting rights.296
manipulative or deceptive behavior in connection with trading securities). Sections
10(b) and 15 supplement Section Nine by regulating manipulation in connection
with over-the-counter derivatives. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 10(b) &
15(c), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78j(b), 78o(c) (regulating manipulative deceptive conduct).
294. See HAZEN TREATISE 3, supra note 282, at 472-85 (outlining anti-fraud pro-
visions of Exchange Act).
295. See id. (noting common fraud claims).
296. See id. (maintaining goal of securities laws). Proxy fraud claims are
claims brought by shareholders against the corporation alleging that the proxy
statements misstated or omitted material facts making the proxy materials mislead-
ing. See id. (explaining common proxy fraud claim). SEC rule 14a-9 creates a im-
plied private right of action for damages caused to shareholders due to the
material omission or misstatement. SeeJ.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)
(holding that SEC rule 14a-9 grants private parties authority to bring claims of
proxy fraud against corporations). Securities fraud is a broad anti-fraud provision
that grants redress for investors or shareholders that have been defrauded due to a
misstatement or omission of material fact, in connection with the sale or purchase
of securities that rendered required disclosures inadequate or misleading. See Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2009) (establishing securities fraud claim). SEC rule 10b-5
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any nation securities exchange, (a) To employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id. To successfully litigate a misrepresentation or omission claim under section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lob-5 promulgated pursu-
ant to section 10(b), a plaintiff must plead and prove, that the defendant (1) made
a misstatement or omission (2) of material fact (3) with scienter, (4) in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities, (5) by means of the mails, interstate com-
merce, or national securities exchange, (6) the plaintiff relied on the defendant's
misstatement or omission, and (7) the defendant's material omission proximately
caused the plaintiff to suffer monetary harm. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934
10(b), Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2009) (establish-
ing necessary elements of plaintiff's claim); Employment of Manipulative and De-
ceptive Devices, SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010) (forbidding fraud
and manipulative practices in connection with purchase or sale of securities). See
also ECA, Local 134 IBEWJoint Pension Trust of Chicago v.JP Morgan Chase Co.,
553 F.3d 187, 197 (2d Cir. 2009) (setting forth elements of securities fraud claim);
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c. Exemptions from the Federal Securities Laws
While the Securities Laws appear comprehensive and strin-
gent, as time passed, Congress and the SEC granted many exemp-
tions to increase efficiency and financial innovation.2 9 7
Unfortunately, these exemptions allowed many of the most danger-
ous securities to go unregulated. 298 Prior to 2008, investment banks
abused these exempted structured products and lead the global
economy into a financial crisis.299
The Securities Act of 1933 provides for three main statutory
exemptions from the requirements to register with the SEC before
offering or issuing securities to the public. 00 SEC's "Regulation A"
exempts offerings up to $5,000,000 from the traditional SEC regis-
tration statement and allows a simplified registration process.30'
"Regulation D" is the primary exemption from registration and is
Geman v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n., 334 F.3d 1183, 1191 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting
that Securities and Exchange Commission is not required to prove reliance or in-
jury in enforcement actions). Insider trading occurs when a corporate insider
such as a director, officer, agent or major stockholder obtains material non-public
information that will likely affect the corporation's stock price and subsequently
trades on account of that information; trading on inside information is broadly
prohibited by the Exchange Act. See In re Cady Roberts, Inc., 40 S.E.C. 907, 08-11
(1961) (holding that trading upon receipt of material non-public information con-
stitutes securities fraud).
297. See HAZEN TREATISE 1, supra note 268, at 509-59 (explaining exemptions
created pursuant to Securities Act).
298. See Mendales, supra note 11, at 1388 (explaining de-regulation and in-
creased exemptions as catalysts for the credit-freeze).
299. See id. at 1360 ("The spark that set off the 2007-2008 explosion in the
financial markets was the failure of the market for collateralized debt obliga-
tions. . . . and the role that the failure of securities regulation played in the blow-
up.").
300. See 15 U.S.C.A §§ 77(c), (d) (providing exemptions from registration re-
quirements). These exemptions do not exempt from the anti-fraud provisions. See
HAZEN TREATISE 1, sup-a note 268, at 437 (noting that exemptions are from regis-
tration requirements, not anti-fraud provisions).
301. See Regulation A, 17 C.F.R §§ 230.251-230.264 (2009) (establishing ex-
emption for small offerings). This exemption allows issuers to distribute a prospec-
tus document outlining the investment opportunity and the document
constituting an offer of securities without prior registration. See HAZEN TREATISE 1,
supra note 268, at 509-10 (creating exemption for small issuers and enabling them
to see prospects of issuance before sustaining costs associated with registration).
Regulation A requires that the offering is accompanied by an offering circular,
which is essentially a watered down version of the registration requirements of
non-exempt issuers. See id. (requiring less extensive disclosure). In addition, Reg-
ulation A, allows smaller issuers to "test the waters" by affording those issuers the
opportunity to solicit investors before completing an offering statement. See id.
(enabling small issuers to pursue capital more freely by obviating their obligation
to sustain large registration costs before knowing whether they have opportunities
for capital infusion). This exemption allows smaller issuers to solicit investors and
make necessary disclosure in a more efficient and cost-effective manner. See id.
(lowering costs for smaller issuers to enable them to gain capital more freely).
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generally used to, among other things, exempt private placement of-
ferings or offerings that are not offered to the public.30 2 Regulation
D posits that the particular investors do not need the protections of
the registration documents and that such investors can fend for
themselves, rendering the registration statement surplusage and
unnecessary.303
These exemptions enabled investment banks to abuse securi-
tized investments to the point of financial collapse.30 4 Without ade-
quate oversight, exempted securities such as MBSs, CDOs, squared
CDOs, and synthetic CDOs were created and purchased at a rapid
rate leading to an artificial increase in housing prices and the crea-
tion of an extensive amount of systemic risk.305
d. Philosophy and Assumptions of the Federal Securities Laws
Louis Brandeis famously stated that "[s] unlight is said to be the
best disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman."306
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
base most provisions on the premise that disclosure of all material
302. See I-IAZEN TREATISE 1, supra note 268, at 528 (outlining Regulation D
and exemptions provided). Regulation D consists of three integrated exemptions
and was designed to expand the availability of exemptions allowed under the Se-
curities Act; Regulation D consists of Rule 504, which provides certain exemptions
for offerings not exceeding one million dollars for a twelve-month period, Rule
505 which provides a set of exemptions for offerings not exceeding five million
dollars in a twelve-month period, and Rule 506 which permits non-public offerings
to qualified or accredited investors without the need of registration and has no
dollar limit with respect to accredited investors. See id. at 528 (explaining scope of
exemptions).
303. See HAZEN TREATISE 1, supra note 268, at 577 ("Rule 506 is a safe harbor
rule."). Rule 506 under Regulation D exempts sales to no more than thirty-five
non-accredited investors and without a prior registration statement; accredited in-
vestors, however, are not counted toward this thirty-five person limit. See id. (refer-
encing constructs of exemption). Thus, for example if an investment bank was
issuing mortgage backed securities, they could potentially issue the securities to
one hundred investors as long as less than thirty-five of the investors are unac-
credited. See id. (noting that person limit is largely illusory). An investor is accred-
ited if they are sophisticated in the financial and business industry, are capable of
evaluating the merits and the risks involved in an investment situation, and are
affluent enough to bear the downside risk of investments. See 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 77(b) (a) (15) (ii) (2010) (describing characteristics of accredited investor).
Thus, investment banks often pursued accredited investors with respect to struc-
tured products and were exempt from direct oversight from the SEC. See HAZEN
TREATISE 1, supra note 268, at 577 (explaining effect of exemption).
304. See Mendeles, supra note 25, at 1360-63 (referencing exemptions as cata-
lyst to sub-prime mortgage market crisis).
305. See id. (explaining how structured products incentivized sub-prime lend-
ing while simultaneously leveraging exposure to underlying loans resulting in large
amount of systemic risk).
306. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE
IT 92 (1914).
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information is the most effective way of ensuring that investors and
shareholders make informed decisions.307 This is known as the
"disclosure-based philosophy" to securities regulation.308
Disclosure-based securities regulation is based upon several ra-
tionales.309 First, it assumes that disclosure of material facts can in-
fluence corporate managers, broker-dealers, and investment banks
to behave with more candor because entities acting with bad faith
would deter capital infusions from shareholders and prospective in-
vestors.310 Second, Congress posited that as long as investors and
shareholders were afforded all material information, they would be
able to independently analyze the merits of particular securities and
make informed decisions.31 1 While disclosure-based regulation of-
fers certain advantages for regulating the securities markets and ex-
changes, particular problems are posed due to its underlying
assumptions and the realities of investing.312 Mainly, the assump-
tion that investors act rationally and analyze all available informa-
tion when deciding whether to invest is in direct contravention with
the irrationalities investors' exhibit when investing as outlined be-
low in Section III-D.3 13
2. Cognizance of Investor Irrationalities
The Securities Laws posit that full and fair disclosure allows
investors to analyze the merits of an investment opportunity and
make informed judgments.314 This hypothesis assumes that inves-
tors act rationally and review and digest the material information
307. See Ripken, supra note 157, at 149-59 (explaining securities laws use of
disclosure philosophy).
308. See id. at 149-50 (outlining purposes of securities laws). The Securities
Act and the Exchange Act were enacted by Congress shortly after the stock market
crashed in 1929. See id. at 149-50 (demonstrating motivations for securities laws).
Many investors lost their life savings as a result of purchasing securities from com-
panies that were worthless. See id. (outlining goals of securities laws and disclosure
philosophy). The Securities Act and the Exchange Act were enacted with the goal
of restoring investor confidence by eliminating the abuses and maintaining the
integrity of the capital markets. See id. (outlining purposes and goals of the Acts).
Comprehensive disclosure was the means by which this goal was to be reached. See
id. (noting assumption that well-informed investors was proper response to fraudu-
lent and manipulative investment practices).
309. See id at 151-59 (explaining rationale of enactment of securities laws and
their approach).
310. See id. at 151 (demonstrating first rationale of disclosure philosophy).
311. See id. at 152-53 (stating second rationale of disclosure philosophy).
312. See id. at 156 (noting flaws in disclosure philosophy).
313. See id. (explaining that irrationalities demonstrated by investors are prob-
lematic to securities laws underlying assumptions).
314. See Pouncy, supra note 10, at 290-305 (describing disclosure philosophy
and its failures).
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afforded to them.3 15 The rational choice model of human behavior
"assumes that a person can perfectly process available information
about alternative courses of action, and can rank possible outcomes
in order of expected utility."s1 6 This model also supposes that "an
actor will choose the course of action that will maximize his per-
sonal expected utility, which may, of course, reflect a concern for
the welfare of others."317
Unfortunately, as shown previously in section III-D of this Arti-
cle, the constraints of human reasoning and cognitive limitations
often cause investors to act irrationally.3 18 Thomas Lee Hazen has
noted that investors "often view investing as a hobby or participate
for the thrill of the game" and "basing investment regulation solely
on the efficient market or rational choice theories ignores a signifi-
cant segment of the market."3 19 Accordingly, the disclosure-based
philosophy may not protect investors from meritless investments be-
cause of investors' limited ability to effectively comprehend and use
corporate disclosures to make informed decisions.3 20
Corporate disclosures have become so complex "that many in-
vestors [are] unable to detect even blatant fraud solely by reading
[the disclosures]. "321 Over time, companies have become increas-
ingly complex and diversified.3 22 As a result, corporations have dif-
ficulty describing their financial health in simple and easily
understandable ways.3 23 With the increasing complexity of disclo-
sures combined with Securities Laws failure to consider the irra-
315. See Ripken, supra note 157, at 149-59 (explaining securities laws use of
disclosure philosophy and underlying assumptions).
316. Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors:
A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI-KEr L. REv. 23, 23 (1989).
317. Id.
318. See Ripken, supra note 157, at 149-59 (outlining failure of disclosure phi-
losophy to consider many investor behaviors).
319. Hazen I, supra note 10, at 401-18.
320. See id. (noting that even when investors can comprehend information
they often construe information in ways reflecting certain biases such as overconfi-
dence, optimism, confirmation or herding bias).
321. Alison Grey Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities Regulation:
A BriefReview, 25 HASTINGs L.J. 311, 325 (1974). Advocates of merit regulation, as
opposed to disclosure-based regulation, argue that disclosures have become so
broad and so complicated that even sophisticated investors are unable to fully un-
derstand the implications of the disclosures. Seejay T. Brandi, Securities Practitioners
and Blue Sky Laws: A Survey of Comments and a Ranking ofStates by Stringency ofRegula-
tion, 10 J. CoRP. L. 689, 693 (1985) (explaining benefits of merit regulation).
322. See Hazen I, supra note 10, at 401-18 (explaining investor inability to un-
derstand corporate disclosures even when investors choose to analyze them).
323. See id. (describing complexity of disclosures). Additionally, disclosure
documents have become a means to circumvent liability by having corporate attor-
neys formulate broad based disclaimers rather than trying to provide investors with
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tional rather than the rational investor, investors and sophisticated
analysts are not properly protected by the securities laws. 3 24
3. Inability to Reduce Systemic Risk Created by Structured Products
"The severe recession that began in 2008 appears to have been
caused, at least in part, by the same failure of financial regulation
that contributed substantially to the Great Depression more than
seventy-five years earlier."3 25 Congress's choice in the 1930s to pur-
sue a disclosure-based rather than a merit-based philosophy to the
federal securities laws coupled with heavy deregulation and in-
creased exemptions created a regulatory environment that was not
capable of mitigating the extreme amount of systemic risk created
by securitization.32 6
Part II's discussion of the financial crisis and its causes provides
clear evidence that the securities laws are flawed and need to be
reformed. 327 Gambling law, given its applicability to structured
product regulation as established in Part III and its effectiveness in
deterring the negative externalities associated with the regulated
activity as established in Part IV, can be used as a rough framework
to reform the securities laws.32 8 By utilizing gambling law as a
framework to regulate structured products, the government can
mitigate the externalities created by the abuse of securitization
while maintaining the intended benefits of structured
investments. 329
meaningful information. See Ripken, supra note 157, at 160-63 (explaining
problems with corporate disclosures).
324. See Hazen I, supra note 10, at 401-18 (criticizing disclosure philosophy).
See Ripken, supra note 157, at 160-63 (detailing problems with disclosure
philosophy).
325. Morrissey, supra note 8, at 647.
326. See Hal S. Scott, An Economy in Crisis: Law, Policy, and Morality During the
Recession: Article I: Suggestions for Regulatory reform: The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the
United States Financial System, 33 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 671, 672-75 (describing
abuses of investments causing financial crisis). Systemic risk is the risk that failure
of one significant financial institution can cause or contribute to the failure of
other significant financial institutions as a result of their linkages to each other.
See id. (defining and explaining systemic risk).
327. For a discussion of the financial crisis and the role of structured prod-
ucts, see supra notes 26-138 and accompanying text.
328. See Scott, supra note 326, at 672-75 (demonstrating that with proper over-
sight sub-prime mortgage market crisis could have been mitigated).
329. For an analysis of how gambling law can be used to effectively revise the
securities laws, see infra notes 331408 and accompanying text.
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V. APPLYING GAMBLING LAW To REGULATE STRUCTURED PRODUCTS
A. Investment Banks as Architects of Their Own Destruction
Skyrocketing markets that depend on purely psychic support
have invariably succumbed to the financial law of gravitation.
Unsustainable prices may persist for years, but eventually they re-
verse themselves. Such reversals come with the suddenness of an
earthquake; and the bigger the binge, the greater the resulting
hangover. Few of the reckless builders of castles in the air have
been nimble enough to anticipate these reversals perfectly and es-
cape without losing a great deal of money when everything came
tumbling down.330
For the past decade, investment banks, as the architects of
their own destruction, engineered a mortgage market bubble that
was simply unsustainable.331 Placed upon seemingly stable fault
lines, the housing market was perceived as an indestructible foun-
dation for the construction of structured products. 332 Once the tec-
tonic plates shifted, however, and the earthquake began, the
foundation of the housing market crumbled, the castles in the sky
succumbed to the financial laws of gravity, and not even the mighty
investment banks were nimble enough to avoid the tumbling wreck-
age.3 33 The quake shook the very understructure of our economy,
tearing down the value of homes, devastating employment rates,
bankrupting businesses, shattering the stock market, and leaving
the U.S. economy and American citizens to toil in the rubble.3 34
As with all major earthquakes, precursor signals preceded the
mortgage market quake.33 5 Unfortunately for the U.S. economy,
however, these precursor signals went unnoticed or were simply ig-
330. BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DowN WALL STREET: THE TIME-
TESTED STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL INVESTING 4 (1981).
331. For a discussion of the creation of the mortgage market bubble, its sub-
sequent collapse, and the resulting financial crisis, see supra notes 26-56 and ac-
companying text.
332. For a discussion of the widespread perception that structured products,
especially the senior tranche, were extremely safe investments, see supra notes 93-
96 and accompanying text.
333. For an analysis of the underlying causes of the financial crisis, and the
resulting externalities, see supra notes 56-138 and accompanying text.
334. For a brief discussion of the economic effects of the financial crisis, see
supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
335. See Max Wyss, Second Round of Evaluations of Proposed Earthquake Precursors,
149 PURE AND APPLIED GEOPHYSICS 1, 1 (1997), available at http://www.springer
link.com/content/h53502g6244q2166/fulltext.pdf ("Currently this List contains
five cases of precursors: (1) foreshocks, (2) preshocks, (3) seismic quiescence
before major aftershocks, (4) radon decrease in groundwater, and (5) ground
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nored.3 3 6 The rapid and unprecedented expansion of household
and consumer debt, sub-prime lending, and structured product
transactions, were either not perceived as a legitimate risk or were
ignored by the financial industry because of the transaction fees
they were achieving through these practices.337
The creation of price bubbles exposes the economy to high
levels of systemic risk, especially when financial institutions integral
to the stability of the economy, such as investment banks, are sus-
ceptible to the risk of a price bubble's collapse. 333 In the past three
decades, Congress and the SEC progressively deregulated the finan-
cial industry.339 By creating broad based exemptions, especially
those for privately placed securities, Congress and the SEC afforded
investment banks the freedom to abuse structured products.3 40
Additionally, the irrationalities of individual and institutional
investors assumed major roles in providing the psychic support that
created these pricing bubbles.34' Without the support of seemingly
continuous investor demand for structured products, the price bub-
ble would not have reached such unsustainable levels. 3 4 2 The Se-
curities Laws failed to prevent the financial crisis because the
government-established exemptions undercut the minimal and
flawed protection that the existing regime afforded investors and by
doing so sacrificed the stability of our capital markets and
economy.343
water level increase."); see also Mendales, supra note 11, at 1388-92 (outlining eco-
nomic indications that severe economic collapse was brewing).
336. See Mendales, supra note 11, at 1388 (asserting that economic indications
of financial crisis went unnoticed).
337. See id. at 1388-91 (outlining reasons why indications were ignored or
unnoticed).
338. See Scott, supra note 326, at 673-79 (defining systemic risk as "the risk
that the failure of one significant financial institution can cause or significantly
contribute to the failure of other significant financial institutions as a result of
their linkages to each other").
339. See Morrissey, supra note 8, at 653-58 (analyzing exemptions that allowed
investment banks to abuse securitization, create large amounts of systemic risk and
bring U.S. economy into recession).
340. See id. (illustrating lack of oversight of securitization).
341. For an analysis of the irrationalities that investors as well as gamblers
exhibit, see supra notes 203-233 and accompanying text.
342. See Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 969-71 (demonstrating investment banks'
desire to collect many transaction fees by innovating new financial instruments to
structure and sell).
343. See Morrisey, supra note 8, at 649-50 (explaining primary flaws in securi-
ties laws). Morrissey posits that:
By adopting disclosure as the underlying philosophy of the federal securi-
ties laws, the framers of that legislation put too much faith in the pru-
dence of investors and the self-policing mechanisms of the capital
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With all financial meltdowns, however, a vital opportunity for
financial reform presents itself; an opportunity to rectify prior
wrongs and an opportunity to secure the future health of the
United States economy. 3 4 4 "The choice of the best regulatory struc-
ture for the markets is influenced by the ways in which we look at
the market structure and the behavior of market participants."345 "A
gambling rationale . . . make [s] regulators and policy-makers con-
sider factors that traditionally have not been in play in determining
regulatory schemes."34 6 Gambling law provides a rough, yet appli-
cable framework that can effectively decrease the externalities
posed by structured products, address the irrationalities exhibited
by individual and institutional investors, and reduce systemic risk
created by the securitization process.347
B. A "Rational" Framework
1. Overview
The devices that states employ to regulate gambling institu-
tions include the following: controlling the licensing of gambling
enterprises; monitoring the daily operations of gaming organiza-
tions; restricting the hours of operations; limiting who may partici-
pate; disallowing gambling on margin; prohibiting gambling
institutions from offering certain amenities; broadly taxing gam-
bling revenues; and controlling an institution's right to advertise. 348
These regulatory devices provide state gaming agencies with the
ability to closely monitor and strictly regulate all aspects of gam-
bling to ensure compliance with all the aforementioned standards
and to preserve the integrity and health of the surrounding com-
markets. As such they passed up the opportunity to exercise more mean-
ingful control over the quality of issued securities by a regime of merit
regulation. The weaknesses in such a half-measured approach were com-
pounded when even that flawed system of financial regulation was under-
mined by an expansion of the exemptions to its central requirement, ie.,
that securities first be registered before they are sold.
Id. at 649 (internal citations omitted).
344. See Mendales, supra note 11, at 1360-61 (2009) (acknowledging impera-
tive need "to analyze the causes of a breakdown in the intended function of protec-
tive law after its occurrence, and to propose changes in the law to prevent it from
recurring"); David Leonhardt, The Big Fix, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, at MM22
(quoting President Obama's Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel as stating "you never
want a serious crisis to go to waste").
345. Hazen 1, supra note 10, at 397 (emphasis added).
346. Id. at 410.
347. For a discussion of gambling regulation, see supra notes 242-267 and ac-
companying text.
348. For a discussion of gambling regulatory devices, their purposes, and
their effectiveness, see supra note 242-267 and accompanying text.
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munity and economy.3 4 9 Similar standards should be adopted to
regulate structured products in order to increase economic
stability.350
To ensure the reduction of systemic risk and increase eco-
nomic stability, securitization regulation should be altered in the
following ways: (1) a single, unified administrative agency should be
created to govern all participants and transactions in the financial
markets; (2) regulatory gaps, such as the private-placement exemp-
tion, should be filled; (3) structured products should be limited to
legitimate hedging transactions; (4) margin requirements should
be imposed upon all structured product transactions; (5) systemi-
cally important financial institutions that participate in structured
products should be subject to greater capital and liquidity require-
ments; (6) credit rating agencies and broker-dealers should be reg-
ulated according to strict licensing guidelines set forth by the
federal government; (7) programs designed to educate investors
about the risks that accompany structured products should be es-
tablished; (8) tax incentives should be established to deter irra-
tional investing; and (9) advertisement of investing activities,
especially low-cost securities, should be restricted or eliminated.351
349. See Hurt, supra note 20, at 374 (demonstrating strictness of gambling reg-
ulation by stating that "many gambling activities and investing activities can be
described equally as speculation . . . . Notwithstanding this reality, investing is an
activity that the law supports and encourages, but gambling is an activity that the
law at least nominally discourages and at most prohibits"); see also Hazen I, supra
note 10, at 375-80 (recognizing disparate regulatory treatment of investing and
gambling).
350. See generally Joshua, Ruby, Sound and Fury, Confused Alarms, and Oversight:
Congress, Delegation, and Effective Responses to Financial Crises, 47 HARv. J. ON LEGIS.
209, 209-52 (2010) (outlining policy changes prompted by financial crisis); see also
SEC Proposed Rule, Disclosure for Asset-Backed Securities Required by Section
943 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 75 Fed.
Reg. 62718-01 (2010) (proposing rule that would require "securitizers of asset-
backed securities to disclose fulfilled and unfulfilled repurchase requests across all
transactions . . ."). Requiring disclosures associated with the purchase or sale of
asset-backed securities is necessary to cure the problems with the securitization
process; however, this is not enough and more paternalistic measures should be
adopted to ensure the stability of the U.S. economy.
351. For an analysis of how structured product regulation should be altered,
see infra notes 352-408 and accompanying text.
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2. Providing Consistent Operational Oversight: Consolidating
Regulatory Duties for Structured Products and Removing
Regulatory Gaps
Legalized gaming enterprises are subject to intense scrutiny
from state gaming agencies.35 2 Meanwhile, structured products
were exempt from regulatory oversight.353 Even if structured prod-
ucts had been subject to the securities laws, mere disclosures would
be unlikely to have mitigated the externalities created by securitiza-
tion in light of investor irrationalities.3 54 In light of these biases, a
more paternalistic approach to securities regulation and the regula-
tion of structured products is warranted and can effectively de-
crease the systemic risk created by these investments. 355
To ensure consistent operational oversight of the financial
markets and structured products, a single, unified administrative
agency should govern all participants and transactions in the finan-
cial markets.3 5 6 The consolidation and harmonization of adminis-
trative agencies governing varying facets of financial markets,
institutions, and exchanges would enable open communication be-
tween many financial regulators, increase efficiency of the adminis-
trative agencies' aggregate actions, and breed consistency and
predictability into the legal framework governing the financial sec-
352. See Rose, supra note 246, at 275-90 (acknowledging pervasive operational
control state gaming agencies exert over gambling enterprises in order to maintain
integrity of gambling operation, surrounding community and economy). For an
overview of the gambling laws and their strict oversight, see supra notes 242-267
and accompanying text.
353. See Rose, supra note 246, at 275-90 (explaining results of strong opera-
tional control).
354. See Morrissey, supra note 8, at 684 ("merit review [is] premised on the
belief that disclosure alone [is] insufficient."). For a discussion of the limitations
of disclosure-based regulation, see supra notes 314-328 and accompanying text.
355. See Hazen I, supra note 10, at 396-97 (asserting that securities regulation
could benefit from more paternalistic approach to regulation). Hazen posits that:
To some extent, any form of market regulation is paternalism, but pater-
nalism that may well bejustified. One of the longtime premises of securi-
ties regulation is that investors need protection not only against those
who would take advantage of them, but also against themselves. . . . The
fact that regulation is protectionist and therefore to some extent pater-
nalistic is not a bad thing.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
356. SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The Significance of
Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 Bus. LAw. 447, 447-
84 (1995) (asserting that consolidation of financial regulatory agencies provides
more consistent and efficient regulatory oversight than competition among multi-
ple financial regulatory agencies).
67
Chuff: Rolling the Dice on Financial Regulatory Reform: Gambling Law as
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2011
636 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JOURNAL
tor.3 5 7 Integrated cooperation between, and consolidation of, the
SEC, CFTC, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), the
Federal Reserve Board, and the Office of the Comptroller of Cur-
rency ("OCC") into a single, cabinet-level department called the Fi-
nancial Oversight & Regulatory Department ("FORD") would
provide the consistent operational oversight of the financial mar-
kets that the U.S. economy needs.35 8
Moreover, the creation of an "oversight council," within FORD,
designed to mitigate the creation of systemic risk is justified given
the inability of the markets to account for and eliminate systemic
risk .3 59 An oversight council with the flexibility to regulate financial
institutions according to the level of risk that institution may be
assuming or imposing on the U.S. economy would diminish the
amount of systemic risk created by these institutions .3 6 0 Like gam-
bling agencies, this oversight board should have broad latitude to
commence institutional stress testing, impose higher capital re-
quirements, dismiss executive officers or directors, restrict execu-
tive compensation, impose leverage limits, implement liquidity
requirements, and prohibit investment transactions that lack merit
or pose a significant risk to adversely affect the economy.3 61 With
this authority, a competent oversight board can effectively combat
investor irrationalities and dilute systemic risk.3 62
Lastly, to ensure consistent operational oversight, regulatory
gaps, such as the private-placement exemption, need to be filled.363
Indeed, as the Chairwoman of the FDIC stated " [t]he principal en-
357. See id. at 447 ("New developments in rapidly evolving markets, it is ar-
gued, require a consolidation of agencies to generate broader perspective, to cre-
ate a 'level playing field,' and to end the possibility of a 'race to the bottom'.").
358. See id. (outlining Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) proposal of con-
solidating host of financial administrative agencies into "one giant mega-regula-
tor"). The Financial Oversight & Regulatory Department ("FORD") is a
hypothetical administrative agency that represents the fictitious consolidation of
many financial administrative agencies into one, cabinet-level department.
359. See Scott, supra note 326, at 726-30 (arguing that financial markets and
institutions require greater oversight in order to function properly).
360. See id. (noting benefits that increase of oversight may have on stability of
U.S. economy).
361. See id. (summarizing functions that could be afforded to government in
order to reduce, externalities, systemic risk and irrationalities created by invest-
ment banking practices).
362. See id. (asserting that with adopted procedures systemic risk creation
would be limited).
363. See Reza Dibadj, Four Key Elements to Successful Financial Regulatozy Reform,
6 HASTINcs Bus. L.J. 377, 385-86 (2010) (explaining that "[t] here are many exam-
ples of actors and products that have 'fallen through the cracks' of regulatory over-
sight: mortgage brokers, hedge funds, and derivative instruments such as credit
default swaps").
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ablers of our current difficulties were institutions that took on enor-
mous risk by exploiting regulatory gaps between banks and
nonbank shadow financial system, and by using over-the-counter
derivative contracts to develop volatile and potentially dangerous
products."3 64 These gaps and exemptions, allow opportunity for
abuse, and must be eliminated in order for investors to truly have
confidence in structured product investments, and to dilute the
prospect of another financial crisis. 3 65
3. Controlling Credit Agencies and Broker-Dealers through Licensing
Broker-dealers, including investment banks, should be strictly
regulated through the use of government licensing to decrease sys-
temic risk created by these entities. Gaming agencies have broad
discretion to grant, hold, or refuse licenses to applicants who wish
to carry on a gambling enterprise.3 66 An applicant must pass back-
ground checks, be deemed financially responsible, and have a req-
uisite level of business competence.367 Although, there is a similar
regulatory structure existing for broker-dealers and investment
banks, the stringency should be increased to match the potency of
gaming licensing procedures to ensure honest and candid broker-
ing practices.36 8 With increased barriers to entry and greater gov-
ernment authority to revoke licenses to sell securities or structure
364. Sheila C. Bair, Op-Ed, The Case Against a Super-Regulatory, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 1, 2009, at A29.
365. See Dibadj, supra note 363, at 385 (asserting need to eliminate regulatory
gaps); Ruby, supra note 350, at 223-24 (explaining gaps in securities laws and pro-
posing various solutions to fill gaps). The SEC proposed a rule to increase the net
worth standard for Accredited Investors, which would limit the amount of institu-
tions or individuals that would be able to use these exemptions. See SEC Proposed
Rule, Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, 76 Fed. Reg. 20 (Jan. 31, 2011)
(proposing to require "the definitions of 'accredited investor' in our Securities Act
to exclude the value of a person's primary residence for purposes of determining
whether the person qualifies as an 'accredited investor' on the basis of having a net
worth in excess of $1 million"). This proposed rule limits only a small proportion
of investors as most institutional investors eclipse the $1 million net worth require-
ment easily. See Dibadj, supra note 363, at 385 (explaining regulatory gaps and
their consequences).
366. See Rose, supra note 143, at 267-75 (outlining stringent licensing proce-
dures state gaming agencies require applicants to endure before granting them
license to operate gambling enterprise).
367. See id. (explaining financial, cognitive, and ethical requirements appli-
cants must satisfy in order to be afforded license to operate gambling enterprise).
368. See Gabaldon, supra note 20, at 278 (acknowledging regulatory scheme
securities laws adopted for licensing to brokers and investment banks and indicat-
ing that law could be improved).
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financial products, the merits of investment transactions would
likely increase.3 69
Strict control of licensing should also be used to ensure inde-
pendent, third-party, rating agencies with the requisite business
acumen and resources to properly grade structured products so
that they accurately reflect the level of risk they actually pose to the
investors.370 Additionally, government licensing should entail close
monitoring of rating agency's compensation as to prevent the agen-
cies from issuing favorable ratings in order to receive increased
compensation.3 7 1 Thus, governmental licensing could effectively
eliminate the conflict of interests rating agencies faced, and ensure
unbiased and accurate credit ratings of structured products. 372
4. Limiting Market Participants
Structured products transactions should be limited to legiti-
mate hedging transactions. Gambling regulation imposes limits on
who is allowed to participate in gaming activities and has broad dis-
cretion to refuse those privileges.373 Gaming agencies or gambling
enterprises limit gambling to people of certain age and can deny
their services to intoxicated participants and compulsive gam-
blers. 3 7 4 Similarly, securities regulation is practically limited to
369. See id. (implying that with increased stringency of licensing procedures
investments would be less likely to be fraudulent).
370. See Lynch, supra note 98, at 230-49 (explaining why credit agencies might
issue inaccurately high credit ratings, how these credit ratings influenced institu-
tional investors to invest large sums of money into structured products, and how
regulation could address problems related to inaccurately high credit ratings);
SEC Proposed Rule, Issuer Review of Assets in Offerings of Asset-Backed Securities,
76 Fed. Reg. 16 (Jan. 26, 2011) (proposing to "require any issuer registering the
offer and sale of an asset-backed security ("ABS") to perform a review of the assets
underlying the ABS" and disclose nature of their findings and conclusions).
371. See id. at 247-49 (acknowledging that investment banks often paid credit
rating agencies' compensation and as a result, credit rating agencies were more
likely to afford investment banks' structured products high credit ratings in order
to ensure investor interest).
372. See id. (suggesting framework to address conflict of interests that affected
credit rating agencies independent valuations). Lynch notes that "credit rating
agencies are sensitive to the needs and desires of their paying clients - the issuers
[of the securities]." See id. at 246 (recognizing main conflict of interest affecting
credit rating decisions).
373. See Rose, supra note 246, at 267-300 (detailing gaming agencies broad
authority to decide who may participate in gambling activities).
374. See GNOC. v. Aboud, 715 F. Supp. 644, 655 (D.N.J. 1989) (holding that
casino has duty to refrain from knowingly allowing intoxicated patrons to gamble);
Krentzman, supra note 260, at 1269 (1996) (explaining arguments in favor of ex-
tending liability for intoxicated patrons to casinos); Aronovitz, supra note 258, at
200-02 (noting Missouri Gaming Commission's voluntary exclusion program that
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adults because of the capital and sophistication requirements. 375
Moreover, structured products are limited to investors who meet
specified net-worth requirements. 37 6 Additional restrictions, how-
ever, should be implemented.377
Structured products were innovated largely to enable market
participants to hedge against potential losses and to allocate recip-
rocal risks to other hedging parties.378 Derivatives trading and
structured product transactions, however, have largely become me-
diums affording speculators opportunities to bet on the future
value of certain assets.379 While speculators are integral to the li-
quidity of these markets, the purpose of these financial innovations
must be maintained.380 Thus, the securities laws should require
prerequisite approval of these transactions in order to ensure that
at least one party to the transaction has a legitimate hedging
motive.38'
Securities regulation should require that the parties rebut a
presumption that they are mere speculators before the transaction
may commence.382 Once determined that one party has a legiti-
mate hedging purpose, that party should be required to prove that
the amount the party is attempting to hedge is comparable to the
protection necessary to offset potential losses from another ven-
ture.3 8 3 Requiring a hedging party, and limiting the hedging
requires casinos to deny participation to compulsive gamblers and recognizing
minimum age requirements for gambling in all jurisdictions).
375. See Gabaldon, supra note 20, at 279 (noting margin requirements and
suitability of investments as factors broker-dealers impose upon investors).
376. See Morrissey, supra note 8, at 655 (explaining that structured products
were only offered to investors who were "able to fend for themselves because of
their wealth and sophistication").
377. See Hazen I, supra note 10, at 377, 437 (acknowledging that many finan-
cial instruments, including structured products, were created in order for industry
professionals to hedge against risk).
378. See id. (discussing hedging purposes of structured products as well as
other derivative investments).
379. See id. at 435(asserting that although created for hedging purposes, struc-
tured products are subject to abuse by speculators).
380. See id. at 436 (noting functions speculators serve within capital markets
but noting volatility they create).
381. See id. at 421 (proposing that maintaining one investor as legitimate
hedger reduces systemic effect of that transaction).
382. See id. at 416-18 (drawing analogy between insurance and derivatives
trading). Hazen posits that: "the law in essence sets up a presumption that an in-
surance contract is a wager on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a particular
contingency but allows the presumption to be rebutted by demonstrating an insur-
able interest - 'proof of circumstances that negative the existence of a wagering
intent."). Id. at 421.
383. See id. at 424 (explaining need for application of insurable interest doc-
trine to derivatives regulation to prevent problem of over-insurance beyond scope
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party's position to what is necessary to offset downward risk, would
substantially lower the possibility for the creation of a price bubble
and greatly reduce market volatility and systemic risk.3 34
5. Imposing Margin, Capital, and Liquidity Requirements on
Structured Product Transactions
Margin, capital, and liquidity requirements should be imposed
upon investors and financial institutions that participate in struc-
tured product transactions. Gambling enterprises are substantially
limited with respect to the amount of credit they can extend to pa-
trons.3 8 5 These limitations are intended to prevent participants
from indebting themselves beyond recovery and to ensure stability
of the local economy.38 6 Similar to gambling law, margin require-
ments should be imposed upon structured investment transac-
tions.3 8 7 Institutional investors that become over-leveraged on a
structured product transaction can easily be forced into insolvency
with one bad transaction.388 Implementing margin requirements
can guard against these disastrous transactions and stabilize the
economy by lowering insolvency rates.389
Additionally, financial institutions should be subject to greater
capital and liquidity requirements to reduce systemic risk associated
of anticipated losses). The CFTC has proposed position limits for derivatives,
which are intended to limit the amount of money investors could spend on deriva-
tives contracts. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CFTC Position Limits, 76 Fed.
Reg. 17 (2011) (stating that "the Commission shall proclaim and fix such limits on
the amount of trading which may be done or positions which may be held by any
person as the Commission finds are necessary to diminish, eliminate or prevent
such burden"). Although this is a step in the correct direction, this will not effec-
tively diminish market volatility unless derivative trading is limited to the amount
necessary to hedge against industry risk, on an ad-hoc basis. See Hazen I, supra
note 10, at 424 (emphasizing need to limit market volatility).
384. See Hazen I, supra note 10, at 424 (arguing that limitations on hedger's
transactions to reflect actual risk of loss would reduce market volatility and sys-
temic risk).
385. See Gabaldon, supra note 20, at 282 (analyzing gambling regulation and
its limitations on how much credit can be extended to gamblers).
386. See id. (noting purposes of such limitations is to limit negative externali-
ties posed from indebted gamblers).
387. See Hazen I, supra note 10, at 426-30 (asserting that margin requirements
reduces risk of individual and institutional investors becoming insolvent because of
overly leveraged positions).
388. See id. (explaining severe risk posed by leveraged positions and exposure
to structured investments); Aaron Lucchettie & Serena NG, Abacus Deal: As Bad as
They Come, WALL ST.J. (Apr. 20, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424
052748703757504575194521257607284.html (outlining Abacus deal that pro-
duced losses of over one billion dollars).
389. See id. (asserting that margin requirements can help investors avoid se-
vere losses).
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with the practices of these institutions.3 9 0 The current capital re-
quirements proved to be grossly inadequate, allowing investment
banks to achieve a thirty-to-one debt-to-equity ratio.39' Indeed, in-
sufficient capital and liquidity was a significant cause of the failure
of three major investment banks at the inception of the financial
crisis.3 9 2 With increased capital and liquidity requirements, finan-
cial institutions would be better situated to survive and recover
from losses and acute stress scenarios.393 Requiring financial insti-
tutions to reserve a greater amount of capital and liquidity increases
their ability to deal with large losses and accordingly reduces sys-
temic risk in the economy.3 9 4
6. Educational Efforts to Reduce Investor Irrationalities
Programs designed to educate investors about the risks that ac-
company structured products should be established to educate in-
stitutional and individual investors about the risks that accompany
structured product transactions. State gaming agencies provide
comprehensive educational programs to educate gambling partici-
pants concerning the risks involved in various gambling activities. 393
These educational programs have resulted in a decrease in irra-
tional gambling and reduced the negative externalities associated
with gambling activities.396 Efforts to educate individuals and insti-
390. See Hal. S. Scott, Reducing Risk Through Reform of Capital Regulation, 13 J.
INT'L EcoN. L. 763, 763-78 (2010) (positing that capital and liquidity requirements
can aid in reducing economy-wide risk); Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Depart-
ment of Treasury Risk-Based Capital Guidelines: Market Risk, 76 Fed. Reg. 1890-01
(2011) (proposing revisions to market risk capital rules "to modify their scope to
better capture positions for which the market risk capital rules are appropriate;
reduce pro-cyclicality in market risk capital requirements; enhance the rules' sensi-
tivity to risks that are not adequately captured under the current regulatory mea-
surement methodologies; and increase transparency through enhanced
disclosures").
391. See Scott, supra note 390, at 765-66 ("The SEC's Basel II-based rules per-
mitted the top five major investment banks to achieve leverage of over 30 to 1.").
392. See id. at 767 ("Insufficient capital was a significant cause of the failure of
Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns, and also played a major role in forcing Merrill
Lynch to sell itself to Bank of America.").
393. See id. at 771-72 (outlining possible liquidity rules that would reduce sys-
temic risk).
394. See id. at 778 ("However elusive a concept 'systemic risk' may be, capital
requirements reflecting true balance sheet values and market risks are indisputably
necessary to shore up a financial system against the threat of a chain-reaction col-
lapse arising from a bank or large financial institution's inability to meet its
obligations.").
395. See Gabaldon, supra note 20, at 280 (explaining education efforts of gam-
bling regulation and benefits of such education).
396. See id. (illustrating how educational efforts can be effective in mitigating
investor irrationalities and market volatility).
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tutional investors must become a more prominent element of se-
curities and structured product regulation.3 9 7 Investors need to be
better educated concerning market fundamentals, valuation of se-
curities, and risks associated with various investments.3 9 8 In light of
widespread investor irrationalities and the complexities of various
securities, investors often enter into transactions under flawed as-
sumptions and create volatility and inefficiencies in the markets. 3 99
Increased educational efforts could have a potential stabilizing ef-
fect on the economy, reduce volatility, and decrease the potential
creation of artificial price bubbles that will inevitably approach
equilibrium. 400
7. Taxing to Influence Rational Investing Behavior
Tax incentives should be established to deter irrational invest-
ing and the creation of systemic risk. The proceeds of gambling are
heavily taxed to provide revenue and funding for the continued
regulation of gambling enterprises and activities. 40 Securities laws
could adopt similar provisions in order to incentivize long-term in-
vestment practices rather than short-term trading, and can influ-
ence investors, especially institutional investors, to assume less risk
397. See George Nnona, In the Wake of the Mortgage Bubble and Financial Crisis:
What Should Securities Regulation Become?, 79 UMKC L. REv. 31, 56-57 (2010) (argu-
ing that securities regulation should educate investors in order to protect investors
and stabilize economy); Henry T. C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investors Beliefs and Gov-
ernment Neutrality, 78 TEX. L. REv. 777, 777-882 (explaining investor irrationalities
and governmental aggravation of those irrationalities); Dibadj, supra note 363, at
388 (emphasizing need for investor education). Dibadj stated that:
[l]ike it or note, almost every working adult is now an investor. Yet too
many customers are making risky, life-changing decisions without having
sufficient knowledge of financial basics such as the time value of money
or the implications of credit. We thus need to place new emphasis on
financial education, perhaps beginning as early as elementary or middle
school.
Id.
398. See Nnona, supra note 397, at 56 ("Individuals should be allowed to take
risk, but they should be better educated about the nature of risk and the indeter-
minacy of value.").
399. See Hu, supra note 397, at 779 ("The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion and the Federal Reserve find themselves in an apparent dilemma between
respecting market primacy and confronting investor enthusiasm for equities.").
400. See id. at 780 (insinuating that investor education can provide economic
stability). Hu notes that the current practice of administrative agencies "have dis-
torted the thinking of even sophisticated investors and created an unnecessary
amount of moral hazard." Id.
401. See Gabaldon, supra note 20, at 281 (discussing tax treatment of earnings
from gambling enterprises and their function of maintaining strict regulation of
industry to maintain its integrity).
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by entering into safer transactions. 402 Securities laws can do this by
implementing what is known as a Pigovian taxation theory, or a sin
tax, that aims "to correct the negative externalities of market activi-
ties."403 A Pigovian tax can effectively deter irrational investing and
the creation of systemic risk.404
8. Restricting Advertising of Investing
Advertising of investing and low-cost securities in particular
should be restricted to reduce investor irrationalities. State gaming
agencies closely monitor the placement and content of advertising
by gambling enterprises.405 Securities regulation could adopt simi-
lar practices to reduce the influence on investors to invest for fun
or in an attempt to beat the market.406 As discussed earlier, this
irrational behavior can lead to market volatility and systemic risk.407
Restricting advertising and controlling the content of the advertise-
ments may reduce the level of irrational investing decreasing mar-
ket volatility and systemic risk.408
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKs
On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Dodd-
Act vying that this Act will spark the reform necessary to mitigate
abuses within the financial system.409 The Act, however, is only the
starting point; effective implementation of this Act is necessary to
cure the primary flaws of the current regulatory framework.410
402. See Mary Ann Liebert, Inc. & Bret F. Meich, The Power to Destroy: The Psy-
chology of Gaming Taxation, 12 GAMING L. REv. & ECON. 458, 461-63 (outlining ways
taxes can influence regulation).
403. Id. at 462.
404. See id. at 463 (recognizing ability to influence certain behavior in order
to reach desired outcomes through taxation).
405. See Gabaldon, supra note 20, at 281 (illustrating effect advertising can
have on gambling and investing).
406. See id. (noting that control of investment advertisements could afford
market stability).
407. See id. (indicating advertising's ability to influence behavior).
408. See id. (explaining that if control of advertising can influence investors to
act rationally, markets will suffer less systemic risk and volatility).
409. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
Law 111-203 (July 21, 2010) (reforming securities laws); See also Barack Obama,
Remarks by the President at Signing ofDodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act, White House (July 21, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-of-
fice/remarks-president-signing-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-
protection-act.
410. See Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, An Insider's View of the SEC: Principles to
Guide Reform, 27 No. 1 CORP. COUNs. Q. ART. 1, 1-6 (2011) (outlining SEC's goals
for reform). Commissioner Aguilar noted that "[n]ow that the Dodd-Frank Act is
law, the focus has moved from Congress to the regulators, including the SEC, to
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Congress has delegated this challenge to various administrative
agencies including the SEC, CFTC, and Federal Reserve.4 11 These
agencies have many issues to address, one of the most important
being regulation of securitization and the structured products cre-
ated through this process.4 1 2
The current Securities Laws fail to properly oversee the securi-
tization process and do not account for the irrationalities institu-
tional and individual investors exhibit. 413 The current framework
allowed systemic risk to build up within the economy and without
proper regulatory intervention this will continue. 4 14 Applying gam-
bling law concepts to the regulation of securitization and structured
products could aid in the dilution of systemic risk pervasive in the
U.S. economy and address the inadequacies of the Securities
Laws.4 15 Accordingly, gambling law can serve as an applicable and
effective framework to properly reform the Securities Laws and the
regulation of securitization.4 1 6 With an increased focus on investor
irrationalities and systemic risk reduction, the prospect of another
severe financial crisis would become less worrisome. 4 1 7
Christopher B. Chuff*
fill in the details and to write rules that will make financial reform a reality. See id.
(emphasizing role of regulators); see Proposed Rules to Implement Dodd-Frank
Act, COMMODITY FuTuREs TRADING COMMISSION, http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegula-
tion/DoddFrankAct/Dodd-FrankProposedRules/index.htm (last visited Jan. 18,
2011) (listing rules CFTC are proposing for implementation of Dodd-Frank Act).
411. See Chairman Gary Gensler, Remarks before the Institute of International
Bankers, U.S. COMMODITIES FuTuRES TRADING COMMISSION (Oct. 21, 2010) http://
www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/ChairmanGaryGensler/opa
gensler-56.html (explaining that the Dodd-Frank Act "requires the CFTC and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to write rules within 360 days").
412. See id. ("The Dodd-Frank Act is very detailed, addressing all of the key
policy issues. . . .").
413. For a discussion of the securities laws and an analysis of their failures to
address investor irrationalities, the creation of systemic risk, and the mitigation of
negative externalities, see supra notes 268-324 and accompanying text.
414. For an illustration of why financial reform is necessary, see supra note
268-324 and accompanying text.
415. For a discussion of gambling regulation and its ability to address exter-
nalities, systemic risk and gambler irrationalities, see supra notes 242-267 and ac-
companying text.
416. See supra notes 145-408 and accompanying text.
417. For a discussion of systemic risk, investors' irrationalities, and their pro-
pensity to cause financial crises, see supra notes 26-144 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Villanova University School of Law; B.S., The
Pennsylvania State University, Smeal College of Business, 2009.
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